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ABSTRACT 
 
     Analytical Inverse Model for Post-Event Attribution of Plutonium. 
(December 2008) 
James Christopher Miller, B.S., Hampden-Sydney College 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. William S. Charlton 
 
An integral part of deterring nuclear terrorism is the swift attribution of any event 
to a particular state or organization.  By quickly being able to identify the responsible 
party after a nuclear event, appropriate people may be held accountable for their actions.  
Currently, there is a system in place to determine the origin of nuclear devices and 
materials from post-event data; however, the system requires significant time to produce 
an answer within acceptable error margins.  Described here is a deterministic approach 
derived from first principles to solve the inverse problem.  The derivation starts with the 
basic change rate equation and ends in relationships for important nuclear concentrations 
and device yield.  This results in a computationally efficient and timely method for 
producing an estimate of the material attributes.  This estimate can then be used as a 
starting point for other more detailed methods and reduce the overall computation time 
of the post-event forensics. 
This work focused on a specific type of nuclear event: a plutonium improvised 
nuclear device (IND) explosion.  From post-event isotopic ratios, this method determines 
the device’s pre-event isotopic concentrations of special nuclear material.  From the 
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original isotopic concentrations, the field of possible origins for the nuclear material is 
narrowed.  In this scenario, knowing where the nuclear material did not originate is as 
important as knowing where it did. 
The derived methodology was tested using several cases of interest including 
simplified and realistic cases.  For the simplistic cases, only two isotopes comprised the 
material being fissioned.  In the realistic cases, both Weapons Grade and Reactor Grade 
plutonium were used to cover the spectrum of possible fissile material to be used by 
terrorists.  The methodology performed very well over the desired energy range.  Errors 
were under two percent from the expected values for all yields under 50 kT.  In the 
realistic cases, competing reactions caused an increase in error; however, these stayed 
under five percent.  As expected, with an increased yield, the error continued to rise, but 
these errors increased linearly.  A sensitivity analysis was performed on the 
methodology to determine the impact of uncertainty in various physical constants.  The 
result was that the inverse methodology is not overly sensitive to perturbations in these 
constants.
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Motivations 
With the proliferation of weapons technology to rogue nations like North Korea 
and Iran and the increasing prevalence of terrorism around the globe, there is growing 
concern that a nuclear device could be detonated in the United States or abroad as part of 
a terrorist incident. (1)  As a result, there has been a renewed interest in nuclear forensics 
to be able to determine the origin and perpetrators of such a heinous act. (2)  The 
forensics field because it is multi-faceted and includes a compilation of several different 
fields including chemistry, physics, and social science. 
There is a basis for concern that a terrorist acquisition and use of a nuclear 
weapon may occur.  The leader of Al Qaeda, Osama Bin Laden, has made many efforts 
to acquire nuclear weapons.  The 9/11 Commission report sites that Osama Bin Laden’s 
effort to develop nuclear weapons capabilities began sometime before 1994. (3)  These 
efforts included attempts to buy uranium in Africa, Western Europe, and the former 
Soviet Union. (3)  Bin Laden has also stated that the acquisition of weapons, including 
weapons of mass destruction, is a “religious duty” for all Muslims. (3)  As a result, there 
is an obvious desire on the part of some sub-state organizations to acquire nuclear 
weapons, but perhaps more troubling is the potential for there to be suppliers of nuclear 
weapons related technology. 
 
____________ 
This thesis follows the style of Nuclear Technology. 
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The most egregious proliferation of weapons technology occurred in the A. Q. 
Khan nuclear black market.  Khan was involved in both vertical (within a country) and 
horizontal proliferation (between countries).  His horizontal proliferation included deals 
with Libya, North Korea, and Iran. (4)  Even though the Khan network appears to be shut 
down, this nuclear know how has been sent around the world.  The North Koreans are 
suspected of being similarly involved with spreading nuclear knowledge and abilities.  
The most recent mark against the Koreans is evidence and accusations by the United 
States that they were assisting Syria in building a graphite moderated reactor similar to 
the one at Yongbyon at a site known as Al-Kibar. (5)  The site was destroyed by the 
Israeli Air Force in September 2007, so a conclusive determination of the activities at 
Al-Kibar may never be reached.  However, the United States Intelligence community 
has implicated the North Koreans in playing a significant role in the Syrian effort. (6)  
The combination of the willingness to develop nuclear weapons side by side with the 
availability of knowledge is a troubling prospect.   
Even though it would take a significant effort to develop a nuclear weapon 
covertly, it is a distinct possibility.  Thus, preparations for the worst case scenario in 
which an unknown sub-state group detonates a nuclear device without warning must be 
prepared for.  There are typically three different scenarios related to the weaponization 
of nuclear and radiological materials: Radiological Dispersal Devices (RDD), Nuclear 
Weapons, and Improvised Nuclear Devices (IND).  This work is focused on the last 
scenario which is the most likely case for a homegrown nuclear device by a terrorist 
organization.  Specifically, this work will focus on a plutonium-based IND. 
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Objectives: Statement of the Problem 
This work focuses on a hypothetical situation where a terrorist organization has 
managed to detonate an IND.  This means that the organization has managed to avoid 
detection while acquiring Pu, designing and manufacturing a viable device, and 
transporting their device to the place of attack.  A plutonium-based IND would require 
approximately 8 kg (1 SQ as defined by the IAEA) of plutonium configured for an 
implosion style device. (7)  These devices would be significantly less sophisticated than a 
typical state military device.  The design would most likely be similar to that of the “Fat 
Man” bomb of the Manhattan Project. (8)  Further, the yield of an IND should be well 
below 50 kilotons (kT).  For an implosion device, the plutonium pit would be uniformly 
compressed with shaped explosive lenses in order to create a supercritical system. (9)  
The basic concept of an implosion weapon is illustrated in Figure 1. 
 
 
Figure 1:  A Fat Man Style Implosion Concept (10) 
 
4 
 
 
 
Another basic variable which will have a significant impact on the scenario in 
question is related to the altitude of detonation.  When the United States used its first 
nuclear weapons in the closing days of World War II, they were detonated at high 
altitude; however, it is more likely that a terrorist organization would use the device at 
ground level.   The dispersal of fission products will depend greatly on the detonation 
altitude.  In the high altitude scenario, the bomb fragments and fission products would be 
dispersed over a very large area.  In the low altitude (and low yield) scenario or ground 
burst event, the fission products and device remnants would be scattered in the 
immediate vicinity of the explosion.  This is the scenario considered in this work.  
Undoubtedly, this dispersion would not be uniform and a sampling procedure to best 
survey the area would need to be implemented in order to improve the accuracy of any 
method applied to the results of data taken from such samples.  
The primary objective of this work was to produce a methodology that estimates 
pre-detonation isotopic ratios using post-detonation isotopic ratios measured with mass 
spectrometry of samples of the bomb debris.  Sophisticated methods for this analysis 
have been developed by the U.S. national laboratories, but those methods are not 
discussed in the open literature.  Accuracy of these methods is likely quite good, but 
computational speed may be limited.  This work focused heavily on developing a 
method with an excellent computation speed even at the expense of accuracy.  The 
intended use of the output of this model is to determine a reasonable initial estimation of 
the actual isotopics to be used in a more sophisticated and computationally intensive 
model.  The ultimate goal of using this method as a pre-processer for other methods is to 
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significantly reduce the overall computational time for the attribution process and to 
provide results with sufficient accuracy to narrow the field of possible origins for the Pu 
used in the device.   In the post-event attribution arena, being able to rapidly rule out 
specific sources is nearly as valuable as finding the exact solution. 
Since much of the work in this field is not published in the open literature, a 
secondary objective of this work is to provide an open source analysis of the attribution 
problem.  Countries who are considering transferring nuclear materials to groups with 
malicious intent may not fully comprehend the ability of U.S. scientists to trace the 
origin of materials back to their particular facilities.  Thus, the open source nature of this 
work provides a deterrent to states considering transfer of nuclear materials to non-state 
actors.  “[But,] nuclear attribution cannot succeed as a threat if the other side has no 
knowledge of it.” (11) 
Inverse and Forward Models 
There are many potential complications and barriers to this research.   Jay Davis, 
a founding director of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), is quoted saying: 
I keep a standard mental list of the five hardest technical problems of which I 
am aware.  Nuclear Forensics and Biological Forensics each make the list.  
There is no assurance that we can work backwards from the effects of these 
horrific events to uniquely determine a perpetrator. (12) 
This problem is difficult because it is an inverse problem in which we are attempting to 
estimate the original state of the system prior to detonation from measurements of the 
state of the system after detonation.  An inverse problem is typically more complicated 
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than a forward problem.  A forward model has specific inputs and characterizations of 
the materials in the original state and the physics describing the evolution of this state 
into the future is well known.  This is not the case with the inverse problem.  The 
amount of material needed to produce a viable nuclear weapon can range dramatically 
based on the sophistication of the design.  “An important variable is the plutonium 
composition, a proliferant device is not likely to be designed or built with US stockpile 
grade plutonium.” (13)  Without the specifics of the design, there will be many unknowns 
that must be estimated including the amount of fissile material and packaging (e.g. 
transportation, disguise, etc.).  Depending on the material and the energy spectra of the 
neutrons during the explosion, several physical properties of the system will change as a 
result of the explosion.  The 239Pu fission cross section is shown in Figure 2.  These 
interaction cross sections describe the probability of a particular atom interacting with a 
neutron and can be guessed in an educated manner.  “But if [the device] is improvised, 
that’s less likely to work.  It might not look like things you’ve seen before.” (2) 
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Figure 2: 239Pu Fission Cross Section vs. Energy (14) 
 
During a nuclear detonation, there will be hundreds of generations of neutrons 
interacting within the system with a population on the order of 1020 to 1022 neutrons. (10)  
The Pu atoms in the unexploded device will have the opportunity to undergo many 
competing reactions.  During the explosion a single Pu atom potentially could interact 
several times creating a suite of isotopes which were not present in the unused device.  
There is no super computer which could model all of these interactions in a reasonable 
time frame.  Thus approximations are made to speed up the process, and a resulting 
uncertainty is introduced. 
The final complication is that the spatial distributions of reactions within the 
device will not occur uniformly.  Different sections of the pit will experience a higher 
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neutron flux than others which in turn will cause different fission rates in various 
sections of the device.  Upon the detonation of the device, much of ground zero will be 
vaporized only leaving miniscule particles to be collected and analyzed.  The method of 
collecting a representative sample of the device is beyond the scope of this work; 
however, it should be noted that a methodology is only as good as its initial input data. 
Hypothetical Scenario: Model Action Plan 
For the hypothetical scenario outlined above, this work comes into play very late in 
the game of the nuclear forensics and attribution effort.  The International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA) has a model action plan to respond to these types of incidents. 
(15)  The model action plan has set steps to ensure not only the safety of the people 
involved and control of nuclear material, but also the preservation of evidence.  The 
action plan has guidelines from the initial response to the analytical follow-up.  The 
following is a basic summary of what would occur onsite following any radiological 
emergency. 
(1) Secure the Incident Site: The first and foremost objective is to ensure the safety 
and security of any people in the immediate vicinity of the incident including 
first responders. 
(2) On-Site Analysis:  This would include gamma-ray analysis, dose calculations, 
and a check for further hazards not initially noticed including secondary devices. 
(3) Collection of Radioactive Evidence:  After the site is deemed safe, a careful and 
comprehensive collection of evidence would occur according to accepted 
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radiological safety practices.  Evidence could consist of sample swipes, liquid 
samples, soil samples, and other particles. 
(4)  Collection of Traditional Forensic Evidence: Some of the traditional evidence 
might have been destroyed during the collection of radioactive samples.  Since 
the site will most likely still be contaminated, the people gathering evidence 
should practice good radiological safety to reduce dose and the further spread of 
contamination. 
(5) Final Survey & Release of Scene: After all necessary forensic evidence has been 
collected, the site can be decontaminated if necessary and released to local 
authorities. (15) 
After the onsite work has finished, there will be days to weeks of follow-up work 
done at the laboratory level.  Ideally the analysis of the radioactive evidence would occur 
within the Network of Analytical Laboratories (NWAL).  This could involve several 
different laboratories for quality assurance purposes.  The working group suggests the 
formation of a team to manage the overall forensics effort.  The analysis is highly 
dependent on the situation.  They analysis would typically have two phases: basic 
characterization and full attribution. (15) 
Basic characterization would be done fairly quickly upon receipt of the evidence.  
This type of analysis includes size, shape, mass, phase, molecular structure, grain size, 
gamma spectroscopy, and other non destructive analysis.  The full attribution work that 
would follow includes computer modeling, mass spectrometry, x-ray fluorescence, and 
high resolution microscopy.  Table 1 is a general timeline for the analysis following a 
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radiological incident. (15)  The work described in this thesis would be part of the full 
attribution analysis step as outlined by Kristo et al.  Ideally, this would be a good tool for 
obtaining preliminary results. 
 
Table 1: Sequence for Forensic Tests after a Radiological Incident (15) 
 
 
Previous Work: Literature Review 
The adaption of nuclear technology to solve problems related to nuclear forensics 
is not a new idea.  The first example of nuclear forensics dates back to the first nuclear 
test by the Soviet Union in 1949.  It was this analysis of airborne samples which 
conclusively proved that the Soviet Union had harnessed the power of the atom. (16)  
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However, based on recent concerns with nuclear terrorism, there has been a renewed 
interest in building modern nuclear forensics capabilities.  The reemergence of the 
nuclear forensics program in the United States began in 1999. (11)  As in the 1950’s, the 
lion’s share of this work has remained classified since it is unavoidably tied to sensitive 
nuclear weapons and national defense information.  Resulting from this veil of secrecy, 
there is not an extensive library of unclassified science and policy literature available on 
this topic. 
It is important to understand the differences between nuclear forensics and 
nuclear attribution. In the international community, the term nuclear forensics and 
nuclear attribution are often used interchangeably; however, for the purposes of this 
work, we will use the following definitions.    Nuclear forensics spans across many 
different disciplines to utilize mass spectrometry, gamma spectrometry, metallurgy, 
electron microscopy, computer modeling, and much more.  It includes the development, 
refinement, and application of technical means to examine nuclear material for uniquely 
identifying characteristics.  Nuclear attribution is a specific use of forensics technology 
for many different problems including smuggling, unknown recovered sources, 
environmental sampling, contaminated areas, and verification of facility operations. 
Attribution also includes the political process in utilizing the scientific result on the 
world stage.  Nuclear attribution borrows heavily from the forensics field, but it is the 
practice of applying nuclear forensic techniques in solving a specific problem.  
Techniques developed for forensics are utilized or adapted to assist in attribution efforts, 
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thus it is important to have a solid knowledge of forensic tools when working post-event 
attribution. 
The United States scientific community is the leader in research related to 
forensics and attribution.  Even though the technical data of such work is unavailable to 
the general public, there are reports related to exercises simulating the attribution 
process.  One such simulation was undertaken in early 2004 where experts in fallout 
analysis gathered in Albuquerque, NM at Sandia National Laboratory.  The scientists 
were divided into small teams and given US nuclear test data.  The spokesman for the 
project commented that some teams succeeded in identifying the tests. (2) 
Sandia National Laboratory is not the only Department of Energy organization 
working on the nuclear forensics and attribution effort.  There are scientific research 
groups dedicated to the problem at both Los Alamos National Laboratory (17) (LANL) 
and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (18) (19) (LLNL).  Ken Moody, one of the 
scientists working at LLNL, led a project to publish an academic textbook on nuclear 
forensics.  The book focuses on understanding the processes in the nuclear field and how 
to detect them.  Approximately three pages are focused on the post-event analysis of 
debris from either an RDD or IND event.  The authors make it very clear that much of 
that work is classified and cannot be discussed in the book, but that the problem is being 
researched. (20) 
One of the more recent advances, a high resolution gamma-ray detection system 
has been developed independently by both LANL and LLNL.  The LANL 
microcalorimter has been able to provide gamma-ray spectra with up to a 47 eV 
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resolution at the full width at half max (FWHM) for low energy incident gammas. (21)  
The LLNL UltraSpec system has shown similar energy resolutions in the 50 to 200 eV 
range.  The two differ in the method of cooling the system to tenths of a degree Kelvin.  
These two systems have been able to increase the resolution of the previous industry 
standard by approximately ten fold.  As a result, these detectors distinguish between 
gamma-rays and x-rays in the same energy range.  With this increase in detector 
resolution, more peaks related to special fissile material can be distinguished improving 
the accuracy of the calculation.  Often in gamma-spectroscopy, the x-rays released by 
radiation interacting with metals surrounding the sample and the sample itself can 
obscure valuable peaks.   These detectors could be used to more accurately, non-
destructively measure the isotopics of fissile material and attributing natural uranium to 
a specific mine. (22) 
The field of mass spectrometry has often been used in characterizing nuclear 
materials.  This is by far the most accurate tool for determining isotopic ratios in a 
particular sample.  It is typically the most expensive process in this series of analytical 
tools.  Any variation of mass spectrometry will also destroy whatever sample it is 
analyzing.  Thus, this technique is performed after some of the more standard non-
destructive assay techniques such as gamma-ray spectroscopy.  One example of mass 
spectrometry being used to solve the origin of unknown material is from Pacific 
Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) at the Hanford site.  Clean up crews came 
across a buried safe that contained a bottle of plutonium liquid.  Jon Schwantes and his 
team at PNNL were able to track the material based on mass spectrometry analysis and 
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Department of Defense records to one of the very first plutonium separations at Oak 
Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL).  They were even able to pin point the exact batch of 
fuel from which the plutonium was separated. 
In addition to the work done on the national level, there have been two previous 
projects undertaken by students at Texas A&M University.  The first of which was a 
project focused on the attribution of material in a Radiological Dispersal Device (RDD) 
event.  This type of attack involves using conventional explosives to distribute 
radiological material.  The work assumed spent nuclear fuel as the material used in the 
device.  From various signatures, the work focuses on pinpointing the source of the spent 
fuel.  The result of the work was the NEMASYS code which can identify several key 
characteristics of the material including burn-up, age, and enrichment within small 
uncertainty windows. (23)  
The second effort conducted at Texas A&M was very similar to the current 
proposed research.  However, highly enriched uranium, rather than plutonium was the 
fissile isotope used in the assumed IND.  The Uranium analysis was undertaken by 
Adrienne LaFleur.  She was able to use her methodology to trace HEU to a specific type 
of enrichment process.  Further, she was able to determine a subset of mines from which 
the original ore was mined.  Similarly, her project was undertaken with the speed of 
calculation as a foremost concern. (24) 
Another group of leaders in the nuclear forensics field are located at the Institute 
for Transuranium Elements (ITU).  They have been focused on the problem of illicit 
trafficking.  This group uses a myriad of analytical tools including mass spectrometry 
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and electron microscopy to back track material through the black market.  This group 
has been able to successfully determine the origin of plutonium to specific reactor types. 
(25)  Their approach distinguishes between heavy water reactors, light water reactors, fast 
breeder reactors, and research reactors.  But the similarities between the various classes 
of light water reactors does not allow for a determination between a PWR, BWR, or 
VVER.  The same research group has also developed techniques for calculating the age 
of uranium (26) and age since separation of plutonium using isotope dilution mass 
spectroscopy (ID-MS) (27) (28).  This group assisted in the analytical work related to two 
seizures of illicit material in Europe and has published several case studies related to that 
work (29). 
There are also several publications by the International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA) and other organizations regarding the status of nuclear forensics capabilities. (30)  
One of the important publications by the IAEA provides International Target Values 
(ITV’s).  These are an evaluation of uncertainties used in various measurement 
techniques.  The ITV’s are considered to be the “state of the practice.”  These values are 
needed in producing quality assurance of measurement work being done around the 
world; however, it provides valuable insight into the technical capabilities of many of 
the laboratories around the world.   Table 2 contains typical detection limits for 
measuring special nuclear material by various forensic methods. (31) 
 
 
 
16 
 
 
 
Table 2: Typical Detection Limits for Various Forensic Techniques (15) 
 
 
These documents focus on the problem of solving the pre-explosion scenarios, 
but they still offer valuable insight into the possible analytical techniques and 
capabilities being used to tackle the difficult problem of post-event attribution.  Many of 
the experts working on the projects listed above are also deeply involved with the efforts 
of the IAEA to provide nuclear forensic support in the case of an emergency.  Thus, the 
available documents are similar in scope and content to much of the aforementioned 
projects.  Even though the exact technical ability for attribution is not public knowledge, 
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by reading between the lines about the current work in mass spectrometry, high 
resolution gamma spectroscopy, and computer modeling, one discerns a significant 
effort toward developing nuclear forensics capabilities to be applied to nuclear 
attribution.    
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CHAPTER II 
FORWARD MODEL THEORY 
In this chapter, some background theory needed to understand the problem will 
be discussed.  A more detailed description of the specific problem is followed by a 
primer on neutron induced reactions.  This is followed by some basics of computer 
simulation of nuclear systems and the introduction of the forward model ORIGEN2. 
IND Basics 
There are two basic designs for an improvised nuclear device: gun-type assembly 
or implosion type assembly.  Gun-type weapons must be made using Highly Enriched 
Uranium (HEU), and implosion type weapons could be made using either Pu or HEU.  
This work is solely concerned with plutonium based devices.  Thus, only implosion 
weapons will be considered.   When using Pu as the fissile material for the device, a gun-
type assembly would not yield a viable device due to the high spontaneous fission rate of 
240Pu – the main contaminant in any Pu sample.  Due to the increased mass required to 
build a gun-type device coupled with the spontaneous fission from 240Pu, a gun-type 
weapon utilizing Pu has a very high chance of pre-detonation or a fizzle should the 
device make it to its intended target. (32) 
Some of the basic components expected to be seen in a viable implosion IND are 
the fissile pit, fast and slow explosives, electronic controls, and packaging.  Depending 
on the sophistication of the design, a tamper, reflector, and initiator could also be 
present.  For the purposes of this work, the sole concern is the fissile plutonium pit; 
however, for the overall attribution effort, many clues related to finding the culprits 
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could be found by analyzing the other portions of the bomb if they survive the blast.  
Implosion weapons can also experience fizzle detonations as well. 
When a device does not achieve its designed yield, it is called a fizzle.  There are 
two common causes for a fizzle: non uniform compression of the fissile pit or slow 
assembly of the supercritical mass. (33)   
Computer Modeling 
Due to a lack of available sample data, this work will need to utilize a forward 
model to produce input data equivalent to what would be measured by mass 
spectrometry analysis of samples.  As previously discussed, a weapon and a nuclear 
reactor generally obey the same basic laws of nuclear physics.  Fortunately, there has 
been a significant amount of work on the development of reactor simulation.  This work 
will use a previously existing nuclear reactor physics code for the forward model.  There 
is a multitude of codes that can be used to track production, depletion, and decay of 
plutonium and actinide isotopes in a nuclear reactor core.  These codes have been 
developed by the national laboratories, academic institutions, and individual nuclear 
reactor vendors.   
The two most common types of codes are Monte Carlo and deterministic.  The 
Monte Carlo method tracks individual particles from birth to death while using random 
numbers and probabilities to predict nuclear interactions.  Since this is a statistical 
process, the more particles tracked, the better the results.  But as a consequence, it is 
common for millions of particles to be run in one simulation which takes a significant 
amount of computational time.  The most common and widely used code of this type is 
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the Monte Carlo Neutral Particle (MCNP) code developed by Los Alamos National 
Laboratory. (34)  The MCNP code has several incarnations with different abilities and 
features.  Typically the MCNP suite of codes is considered to be extremely accurate and 
is the main benchmarking resource in the nuclear research and development industry. 
Deterministic codes solve specific equations as opposed to following specific 
particles from birth to death.  In nuclear engineering, deterministic codes typically solve 
either the transport equation or the diffusion equation.  These codes vary in complexity 
and have incarnations that address problems spanning from three dimensional multi-
group solutions to one dimensional single-group solutions.  One example of a 
deterministic code is TransLAT.  TransLAT has the ability to solve one to three 
dimensional problems as well as multi-energy-group problems. (35) 
Another deterministic option would be to run a lattice physics code.  HELIOS is 
one version of this type of code.  This code solves the neutron transport equation using 
the method of angularly dependent, current-coupled collision probabilities.  HELIOS 
solves multi-group problems with up to 190 neutron energy groups. (36)  HELIOS has 
been benchmarked to different power reactor types and performed very well compared 
to experimental measurements of spent fuel. (37)  The problem with using a lattice 
physics code is that it depends on having a large number of repeated cells.  Typically 
when modeling a reactor in a lattice physics code, one fuel pin will be modeled and the 
results of that simulation will be extrapolated to the full reactor size.  This type of 
modeling is not appropriate for the IND problem since the specifics about the IND 
design are most likely unknown. 
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 Each specific code has different methods of solving the governing equations 
which introduces different embedded assumptions.  An example of these embedded 
assumptions is that in reality the transport equation is intrinsically coupled with the 
change rate equations for a given system.  As time passes, the number of atoms of a 
specific isotope will be changing as well as the incident neutron flux.  Thus the reaction 
rates for each isotope will be changing with time.  This time dependence exponentially 
increases the complexity of the system of equations to be solved.  A standard way of 
simplifying this time dependence is to decouple the transport and change rate equations 
by using a constant flux. 
Another type of code that would be very appropriate for this work is a nuclear 
weapon simulation code.  However, these codes are not available for unclassified public 
use. 
The Forward Model: ORIGEN2 
The forward model selected for this work was the Oak Ridge Isotope Generation 
and Depletion Code Version 2.2 or ORIGEN2.  ORIGEN2 was developed in the 1980’s 
and 1990’s to calculate the buildup, decay, and processing of radioactive materials.  
“ORIGEN2 uses a matrix exponential method to solve a large system of coupled, linear, 
first-order ordinary differential equations with constant coefficients.” (38)  This is a very 
computationally efficient program and runs are typically less than one minute on a 
modern personal computer. 
The ORIGEN2 code is an open source code that can be accessed by the general 
public.  Typically ORIGEN2 is used for modeling pressurized and boiling water reactors 
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as well as reprocessing facilities, but the code has the ability to model an extensive 
number of reactor types and situations.  This particular code has several advantages.  
One of the reasons for choosing ORIGEN2 is related to its library for the Fast Flux Test 
Facility (FFTF (38)) for plutonium and uranium.  This library provides the one group 
fast neutron interaction cross sections and fission yields for both plutonium and uranium.  
These cross sections are read into ORIGEN2 from a preexisting library.  Other codes 
create collapsed cross sections from data based on the input deck.  During execution, the 
program tracks the probabilities of changes in the material with a transition matrix, this 
matrix is built based on the input parameters and consists mostly of zeros to form the 
matrix for the exponential matrix method.  ORIGEN2 uses a composite solution 
algorithm composed of three different techniques.  First the program uses asymptotic 
solutions to reduce the transition matrix to a more manageable size.  This technique 
effectively removes the shortest lived products from the model.  Then the reduced 
transition matrix is further reduced by the exponential matrix method.  The final phase is 
to use a Gauss-Seidel successive algorithm in conjunction with another set of asymptotic 
solutions.  More specifics about the computational workings of ORIGEN2 can be found 
in the ORIGEN2 Manual listed in the references section. (38) (39) 
ORIGEN2 treats the system as zero-dimensional, point-wise, and homogeneous.  
This type of model averages the incident flux and interactions over the entire system. 
This is appropriate for this work since the exact design and dimensions of the IND are 
not known, and it is possible to add uncertainty by incorrectly making assumptions 
regarding the design.  A more sophisticated forward model would require a significantly 
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larger amount of detail regarding the geometry and material compositions 
comparatively.  ORIGEN2 also can easily calculate the radioactive decay of the fission 
products in a single step following irradiation. As a result, the output of ORIGEN2 can 
be fed directly into the inverse model.  Even though ORIGEN2 is not a weapons 
simulation code, it has the capability to provide data to study the feasibility of this 
methodology. (24) 
As with any forward model, ORIGEN2 has a few potential issues.  Since this 
code was not developed to model nuclear weapons, the model could have issues with the 
extremely short time period of a nuclear detonation.  One further issue is that the 
ORIGEN2 code is fairly old in the world of computer simulation.  There has not been 
any updating of the code since 2002. (38)  As a result, ORIGEN2 might not be using the 
most up to date modeling techniques or nuclear data.  Despite those potential issues, 
ORIGEN2 is an appropriate forward model to use with this inverse model because of its 
versatility, computational efficiency, performance in benchmarking and wide spread use. 
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CHAPTER III 
INVERSE MODEL DERIVATION 
The approach of this methodology is to start from first principles of nuclear 
interactions to derive a system of equations to estimate the pre-detonation isotopics of 
the fissile material originally used in the IND based on the isotopics of key nuclides after 
the detonation.  The input data (post-detonation isotopics) for this system would come 
from mass spectrometry analysis of samples taken around the blast site.  Mass 
spectrometry analysis typically results in ratios of atoms of a particular isotope to 
another reference isotope.  Some discussion of how the inverse model was derived is 
given in this chapter along with the resulting equations.  A full step-by-step derivation of 
the system of equations can be found in APPENDIX B. 
Simplifying Assumptions 
The actual nuclear physics occurring in this system is particularly complicated.  
An even further complication is that the device being modeled for this inverse 
methodology has a significant number of unknowns.  It would take an enormous amount 
of computing power and time to attempt to model the processes without making some 
simplifying assumptions.  One of the key objectives of this work is the development of a 
computationally efficient model.  The following assumptions are embedded in this 
inverse model. 
During the short lifetime of the nuclear detonation, the neutron flux within the 
device will vary by region and time.  In order to remove the time dependent nature of the 
neutron flux, a time and spatially averaged neutron flux was used.  This particular 
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assumption is very common in nuclear engineering forward burn codes.  Each isotope 
could experience several different interactions with the incident neutrons.  But each 
isotope will have a dominant production and depletion interaction.  These neutron 
induced interactions will physically alter the material on the atomic structure.  Many of 
the competing reactions will not change the material, so they can be ignored in this 
work. 
Further, any particular atom could undergo several interactions, but the total time 
of the nuclear detonation will be on the order of 10-6 seconds.  This is much shorter than 
in a nuclear reactor, so in order to remove several small terms at the end of the change 
rate equation this work will assume that each atom will undergo only one interaction 
during the detonation.  Since the amount of material depletion and production is 
relatively small, this is not an unrealistic assumption.  The amount of each isotope will 
change during the event, but the changes are less than one order of magnitude. 
Another assumption comes out of the time scale of the nuclear event.  Since the 
fission products that will be used in this methodology have long half-lives compared to 
the event time frame, the infinitesimally small number of decays occurring during the 
detonation will be neglected.  This assumption introduces little error due to the fission 
product selection that will be discussed later, but the decay occurring during the time 
between detonation and sample analysis will be addressed.  Further, the isotopes of 
plutonium being considered in this system are radioactive; however, their half-lives are 
extremely long.  Radioactive decay of plutonium atoms in general during the entire 
process, detonation to sample analysis, will be ignored completely.  
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The final computational assumption involves the neutron interaction cross 
sections.  The cross sections for each isotope vary based on the incident neutron energy.  
Running an energy dependent neutron code would significantly increase the overall 
computation time.  Thus, the fission averaged cross section data from the ORIGEN2 
library will be used.  Since all of the neutrons appearing after the first generation can be 
assumed to be produced by fission, this is not an uncommon assumption.  Even though 
the number of assumptions embedded in the derivation of this methodology seems high, 
they are common nuclear engineering approximations which are well understood in the 
reactor modeling field. 
Atomic Level Production and Depletion 
The basic nuclear physics of a nuclear explosion is not much different than that 
of a nuclear power reactor.  On the atomic level, neutrons are interacting with the 
individual atoms in the material.  Each material will interact differently based on various 
quantum mechanical properties of the atomic structure.  These different interactions are 
quantified into nuclear cross sections, which are essentially probabilities that a certain 
reaction will occur for a specific atom for a neutron track length and number of incident 
particles.  These cross sections depend on various parameters including the energy of the 
incident particle and temperature of the material.  For this work, fast neutrons are the 
main concern since no moderator is present in the weapon. 
In the relatively short lifetime of a detonating IND, isotopes will be depleted and 
will build up within the system.  In this particular system, the primary isotope being 
depleted will be 239Pu.  This will produce fission products and higher actinides.  Since 
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this work focuses on the pre-detonation characterization of the material, neutron induced 
production and depletion reactions are paramount. 
Scattering and Absorption 
When a neutron comes into contact with an atom, there are two possible 
outcomes: scattering or absorption.  Scattering reactions do not result in production or 
depletion of nuclei.  The other possibility is that the neutron will be absorbed by the 
nucleus. Absorption reactions result in depletion or production of nuclei. Absorptions 
reactions include fission, radiative capture, neutron production, and charged particle 
production.  The probabilities for some of these reactions are very small compared to 
competing reactions.   
Properties of Plutonium 
Since this work is only concerned with IND’s composed of plutonium, the 
isotopes of concern will be 238Pu, 239Pu, 240Pu, 241Pu, 242Pu, and 241Am.  Each of these 
isotopes is likely to be present in any plutonium pit.  Thus, each carries information 
related to the origin of the material.  All of these isotopes will be subject to a flux of 
neutrons causing build up and depletion.  The work described in the literature review 
centered on tracing material that had not been detonated – pre-event attribution.  But the 
materials and isotopic ratios will change as the neutrons interact with the IND atoms 
during the event. Using these interaction probabilities, the post-event material isotopics 
can be used to produce pre-event isotopics which can take advantage of previous efforts 
to attribute the origin or source of the material.   
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Each isotope will interact similarly; however, each will have different interaction 
tendencies.  The total cross sections of the plutonium isotopes are on the same range, but 
each has unique probabilities for each interaction.  For example, 239Pu is less likely to 
scatter a neutron than 240Pu, and 241Pu is five times more likely to have a neutron 
producing reaction than 239Pu.  The neutron interaction cross sections for these isotopes 
are given in Table 3. 
 
Table 3: Cross Section Properties of Plutonium (14) 
Nuclide Total  Fission Radiative Cap. Scattering Neutron Producing 
  (n,f) (n,γ)  (n,n) (n,2n) 
238Pu 8.829 1.994 0.0993 6.7306 0.003669 
239Pu 7.712 1.80 0.05294 5.854 0.004045 
240Pu 7.723 1.357 0.09328 6.269 0.003547 
241Pu 7.84 1.648 0.1182 6.052 0.02137 
242Pu 7.934 0.08787 1.127 6.71 0.006667 
241Am 7.784 1.378 0.2296 6.173 0.0006204 
All cross sections are the fission spectrum average
All cross sections in barns     
 
Dominant Production and Depletion Mechanisms 
For the inverse model, some of the interactions can be ignored.  There are many 
different types of reactions occurring simultaneously during a nuclear event.  Often, the 
most likely reaction, may not add detail to the methodology.  For example, 238Pu will 
undergo some fissions in this system; however, due to the small proportion of this 
particular isotope, these fissions will not significantly contribute to the fission product 
signature.  The production and depletion mechanisms in this system are radiative capture 
to create actinides higher than 239Pu, the fission of 239Pu, and the (n,2n) neutron 
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 Er න ΣfPu-239ሺtሻԄሺtሻdt
T
0
=ΨρPu-239 (1)  
where (Er) is the energy recoverable from fission, and (ρPu-239) is the density of 239Pu, 
and where ΣfPu-239 is the macroscopic fission cross-section of 239Pu. 
This approximation of the yield will tie all of the equations for different isotopic 
ratios together.  In order to simplify the equations, a burn-up factor (ΨX) will be used.  
This factor, which is the yield multiplied by a physical constant, is given by, 
 ΨX=Ψ
NPu-239(0)
NPu-239(T)
NPu(0)
NPu-239(0)
 (2)  
where NX (t) denotes atom density of isotope X at time t. 
 For this work, it is important to note that the quantity being calculated is 
essentially the total number of fissions.  An approximate yield is found by assuming the 
device is made from one significant quantity as defined by the IAEA.  The significant 
quantity for plutonium is 8 kg.  So the yield is essentially energy released for a given 
amount of mass.  Burn-up is a similar quantity.  Burn-up is used in quantifying the 
amount of energy released for a specified amount of material in reactors.  These two 
normalized groups are intrinsically related.  In this work, they are considered to be the 
same value. 
Fission Product Selection 
One of the main products that will build up in the bomb’s fissile core will be 
fission products.  These are the two heavy masses produced by splitting the 239Pu atom.  
In any workable nuclear device design, there should be effectively no fission products 
present in the material before detonation.  Thus, all of the fission products will have been 
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a direct product of the neutron flux seen during detonation.  From the fission products, a 
value for the energy released can be approximated.   
There are many possible fission products to be considered for use in this 
methodology.  The three fission products selected for this work are: 89Sr, 90Sr, and 95Zr.  
These three fission products have been selected based on their nuclear properties.  An 
important reason for their selection is that they have similar atomic weights which will 
be advantages for a mass spectrometry analysis.  Also, these particular mass chains have 
relatively high cumulative yields than some other fission product mass chains.  The 
mass-yield chart for the fission of plutonium is shown in Figure 4.  The yield for these 
isotopes is different for the fission of 235U, but these isotopes are prominent in that 
process as well.  Further, each of these fission products has a relatively long half life.  
Most fission products are very short lived and decay rapidly toward more stable 
isotopes.  Each of these isotopes is near the line of stability on the chart of the nuclides.  
The final advantage these particular isotopes have is a small neutron absorption cross 
section in the fission averaged spectrum.  This means that the fission products produced 
in the event will not significantly “burn” out of the sample during the event. (14) (40)  Since 
the probability of one of these fission products undergoing a reaction is small, this work 
assumes that every fission product produced will remain after the detonation.   The 
physical constants for these fission products can be seen in Table 4. 
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Figure 4: Fission Yield vs. Mass for 239Pu (41) 
 
Table 4: Fission Product Properties (14) 
Fission 
Product Half Life 
Cum. 
Yield 
Total Cross 
Section Absorption Scattering 
    (percent) (barns) (barns) (barns) 
89Sr 50.52 days 1.81 5.662 0.00245 5.647 
90Sr 28.78 years 2.13 5.661 0.00421 5.652 
95Zr 64.02 days 4.77 5.661 0.02721 5.622 
 
Time of Explosion (Decay Time Correction) 
Undoubtedly, there will be a time gap between the detonation of the device and 
the sample analysis.  The fission product decay occurring during this time gap must be 
0.0
1.0
2.0
3.0
4.0
5.0
6.0
7.0
8.0
60 80 100 120 140 160 180
Fi
ss
io
n 
Y
ie
ld
 (P
er
ce
nt
)
Mass Number (amu)
Thermal
Fast
33 
 
 
 
accounted for.  The exact time since detonation can be found by using measured samples 
of 89Y/239Pu and 89Sr/239Pu.  The fission yield of 89Y is very small, and it is a reasonable 
assumption to set the initial value of 89Y after detonation to zero.  Also, 89Y is stable (42), 
and will not decay further.  Thus any 89Y will have grown into the samples by 
radioactive decay of 89Sr.  This decay time (Tdecay) is given by 
 Tdecay=
1
λSr-89
ln ቈ
NY-89ሺTሻ
NSr-89ሺTሻ
+1቉ (3)  
where λSr-89 is the decay constant for 89Sr. 
The exact time of detonation will be recorded by other means allowing an 
opportunity to compare the calculated detonation time with the observed detonation 
time.  This gives a check to see if the samples taken have produced credible data. 
ΨX Calculation with Fission Products 
After each measured fission product isotopic ratio has been corrected for the 
decay experienced between the event and measurement, the three selected fission 
products can be used to estimate the overall energy released from fission.  Since the 
absorption cross-section for each fission product is small, the depletion of fission 
products due to neutron absorption has been ignored.  Thus each fission product has one 
simple equation to relate the measurements to the burn-up of the material.  An average 
of the three results will yield the best approximation for the burn-up factor.   The 
equations are: 
 ΨX=
NSr-89(T)
NPu-239(T)
ErNa
YSr-89mPu
 (4)  
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 ΨX=
NSr-90(T)
NPu-239(T)
ErNa
YSr-90mPu
 (5)  
 ΨX=
NZr-95(T)
NPu-239(T)
ErNa
YZr-95mPu
 (6)  
where Yx is the cumulative fission yield of isotope X, Na is Avogadro’s number, and mPu 
is the original atomic mass of Pu.   The three equations are basically the same with the 
corresponding cumulative fission yields for each isotope. 
Plutonium Ratio Calculations 
Ultimately to trace IND material to its origin, information must be gathered from 
all the materials in the device including any contaminants.  So, this work is concerned 
with determining the isotopic ratios of all the major plutonium isotopes that could have 
originally been in the system.  These isotopes are the range between 238Pu and 242Pu, 
including 241Am.  The equations for these isotopes are all solved successively using the 
burn-up factor found from the fission products and the result from the previous equation.  
Each isotope is assumed to have only one dominant reaction in order to simplify the 
equations.  These reactions are discussed in Chapter II.  To further simplify the equation, 
each atom is assumed to only undergo one interaction.  This assumption means that only 
the atoms present in the original material can be transmuted into other isotopes. 
The ratio of 239Pu atoms before detonation to 239Pu atoms after detonation is 
given by 
 
NPu-239ሺ0ሻ
NPu-239ሺTሻ
=1+
σaPu-239
σf
Pu-239
mPu
Na
1
Er
ΨX (7)  
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where σaPu-239 is the microscopic absorption cross-section of 239Pu, σfPu-239 is the 
microscopic fission cross-section of 239Pu. 
Each other isotope of interest has an equation to determine its pre-detonation 
isotopic ratio with the post-detonation atom density of 239Pu.  The equation for 238Pu is 
slightly different from the other plutonium equations.  This is due to the production 
mechanism.  238Pu is created from 239Pu by an (n,2n) neutron producing reaction.  The 
main difference in the equation is that the cross sections have been changed to reflect 
this difference.    These ratios are given by:  
 
NPu-240(0)
NPu-239(T)
=
NPu-240(T)
NPu-239(T)
-
σγPu-239
σf
Pu-239
mPu
Na
1
Er
ΨX (8)  
 
NPu-241(0)
NPu-239(T)
=
NPu-241(T)
NPu-239(T)
-
NPu-240(0)
NPu-239(T)
σγPu-240
σf
Pu-239
mPu
Na
1
Er
ΨX (9)  
 
NPu-242(0)
NPu-239(T)
=
NPu-242(T)
NPu-239(T)
-
NPu-241(0)
NPu-239(T)
σγPu-241
σf
Pu-239
mPu
Na
1
Er
ΨX (10)  
 
NPu-238(0)
NPu-239(T)
=
NPu-238(T)
NPu-239(T)
-
σn,2n
Pu-239
σf
Pu-239
1
Er
mPu
Na
ΨX (11)  
where σγPu-239 is the microscopic (n,γ) absorption cross-section for 239Pu, σγPu-241 is the 
microscopic (n,γ) absorption cross-section for 241Pu. 
 Americium-241 is a very important isotope in nuclear forensics and attribution.  
When plutonium is freshly separated, there is no 241Am present.  But in plutonium 
samples that have aged, 241Am builds up as 241Pu decays by beta particle emission.  Thus 
the relative quantity of 241Am present is related to time since the last reprocessing of the 
plutonium sample.  Using the time since the last reprocessing is a way to eliminate many 
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possible sources for the material.  So this work methodology also includes a calculation 
of the 241Am ratio.  This particular isotope is not produced during the nuclear chain 
reaction, but it will be depleted slightly by an incident neutron flux.  By using the same 
assumptions used for computing the ratios of plutonium isotopes, the amount of 241Am 
present at the instant before the event can be calculated by 
 
NAm-241(0)
NPu-239(T)
=
NAm-241(T)
NPu-239(T)
exp ቈ
σabsorb
Am-241
σf
Pu-239
mPu
Na
1
Er
ΨX቉ (12)  
where σabsorbAm-241 is the microscopic (n,γ) absorption cross-section for 241Am. 
 After determining the ratios of all the Plutonium isotopes with respect to the 
post-event 239Pu number density, the total number of fissions can be found.  This is done 
by summing the plutonium isotope ratios and dividing this into the burn-up factor.   
 
Ψ=ΨX
NPu-239(T)
NPu(0)
=ΨX ෍ 1 Nisotope(0)
NPu-239(T)
൙
isotopes
 
(13)  
The initial 240Pu/239Pu ratio is found using: 
 
NPu-240(0)
NPu-239(0)
=
NPu-240(0)
NPu-239(T)
NPu-239(0)
NPu-239(T)
൘  (14)  
Similarly for all isotopes of interest the pre-detonation ratio can be found with: 
 NIsotopeሺ0ሻ
NPu-239ሺ0ሻ
=
NIsotopeሺ0ሻ
NPu-239ሺTሻ
NPu-239ሺ0ሻ
NPu-239ሺTሻ
൘   (15)  
These are the full isotopic ratios of the pre-detonation Plutonium.   
Use of Methodology (Flow Chart) 
 The system of equations derived above has many interrelated parts. A flow chart 
of the implementation of the methodology can be found in Figure 5.  The sample data 
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created by ORIGEN2 is first used to find the decay time and each of the fission products 
are then adjusted to reflect the calculated amount of decay time.  This is done using 
Equation 3.  The three fission product ratios are used to determine the burn-up factor, 
ΨX.  The results from Equations 4, 5, and 6 are averaged to get ΨX.  From here, the ratio 
between 239Pu before and after detonation is found.  This is done using Equation 7.  This 
ratio in combination with the burn-up factor is used to find all the ratios for the 
remaining plutonium isotopes using equations 8 – 12.   The results from the entire suite 
of isotopes are recombined to find the yield of the device with Equation 13.  
Concurrently, each ratio is also corrected to the pre-detonation time frame using 
Equations 14 and 15. 
 
  
 
 
 
Figure 5: Inverse Methodology Flow Chart 
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CHAPTER IV 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Presented here are the results from testing the feasibility of the methodology.  
The discussion begins with the input sample selection, followed by the testing with the 
forward model, the inverse model execution, and a discussion of the sensitivity of the 
methodology. 
Input Samples 
As previously discussed, there is a broad spectrum of plutonium isotopics that 
could be used to create a viable improvised nuclear device.  In order to best test the 
range of possibilities, several different scenarios were used.  The testing was broken 
down into two main cases: simplified and realistic.  In the simplified, there are only two 
nuclides present in the bomb material: 239Pu (95 weight percent) and 240Pu (5 weight 
percent).  In the realistic cases, the other isotopes of plutonium and 241Am included.  
Both weapons grade plutonium and reactor grade (43) plutonium are considered in the 
realistic cases.  The weight percent of each isotope used in the cases are listed in Table 5. 
The simplified case is designed to test the response of the methodology over 
various yields of devices.  It is impossible to say what the exact yield a terrorist 
organization would attempt to achieve; however, the most likely scenario is that a 
terrorist device would be well under 50 kilotons (kT).  The realistic cases are designed to 
test the performance of the methodology with an entire suite of plutonium isotopes 
present.  With the increase plutonium “contaminants,” there will be more of the 
competing reactions related to the higher plutonium isotopes.  Since there is debate on 
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whether or not a functional bomb can be made out of reactor grade plutonium, a reactor 
grade sample has been included.  The purpose of this is two-fold.  This sample has a 
significant amount of contaminants and it is at the lowest end of 239Pu content which 
covers the full range of possibilities. 
 
Table 5: Plutonium Samples Used with ORIGEN2 
Nuclide Ideal World Weapons Grade Reactor Grade 
  weight percent weight percent weight percent 
234U 0.0 0.00046 0.0 
237Np 0.0 0.00088 0.0 
238Pu 0.0 0.00498 2.87 
239Pu 95.0 94.98 54.34 
240Pu 5.0 4.8 25.72 
241Pu 0.0 0.123 7.05 
242Pu 0.0 0.0052 6.72 
241Am 0.0 0.089 3.3 
 
Forward Model Results 
 Before jumping to the testing the inverse model, several tests were run on the 
forward model.  Since ORIGEN2 uses a homogeneous cross sections and fission yields, 
users of ORIGEN2 often use multiple irradiation periods in the input deck to more 
realistically account for the changes of material and neutron flux over time. (39)  
However, this work has an extraordinarily short irradiation time as compared to a reactor 
and a multiple step irradiation is not practical.  To test the response of ORIGEN2 over 
short time periods a series of runs was completed.  The input material was the Weapons 
Grade plutonium sample described above.  This simulation was for a ten kiloton blast.  
The irradiation time was varied from a half second and very high neutron flux to six 
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thousand seconds and proportionally smaller neutron flux.  The result was that the code 
calculated the exact same solution at the low time interval as the high time intervals.  
The isotopic ratios for the selected fission products and 240Pu with respect to 239Pu output 
by ORIGEN2 during these tests are shown in Figure 6.  Due to the consistency of the 
results, the ORIGEN2 output will not vary as a result of the short irradiation time step. 
 
 
Figure 6: Irradiation Time Interval Test Results for ORIGEN2 
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solving the same physics equations while using identical cross sections and fission 
yields, the identical performance of the two codes is predictable.  Despite the congruence 
of the two programs, the ORIGEN2 version designed for fast reactors will be used for 
the remainder of this work. 
Inverse Model Results 
 Our inverse model equations were programmed into Microsoft Excel.  From the 
forward model, the grams of each isotope are uploaded into the program where isotopic 
ratios are calculated.  Using these, the system of equations runs within Excel 
exceptionally quickly.  A big advantage for this implementation is that each step can 
explicitly be seen in order to trace any inconsistencies.  
Simplified Case 
 The simplified scenario was tested over a broad range of possible weapons yields 
starting from 0.1 kT to 100 kT.  The range of yields was incremented by five kT 
intervals.  Since this scenario contains only two plutonium isotopes, the equations for the 
other plutonium isotopes are not used.  As a result, the simplified case only has two 
solutions.  These solutions are the yield and the 240Pu to 239Pu ratio.  The solution given 
by the methodology was compared to the expected results as was given by the forward 
model.  The two numbers were compared using the percent difference formula, 
 
Percent Difference=
|Nactual-Ncalculated|
Nactual
*100 (16)  
 
where N is the quantity being compared.  The results from the simplified case can be 
seen in Figure 7. 
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Figure 7: Percent Error in 240Pu/239Pu Ratio and Burn-up for the Simplified Case 
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Realistic Cases 
In testing the methodology on the realistic case, yields of 10, 20, and 30 kT were 
used.  The system performed very well.  As expected, with an increase in the burn up, 
the errors in the higher plutonium isotopes increased.  The largest errors were seen in the 
242Pu and 241Am ratios.  The largest of these errors was just over six percent.  It is 
noteworthy that the change from the simplified case to the realistic case did not 
significantly change the amount of error in the 240Pu/239Pu ratio and calculated yield.  
The results of the three tests are graphed by calculated quantity together in Figure 8.  
The data for each of the three simulations can be seen in Table 6, Table 7, and Table 8. 
 
 
Figure 8: Weapons Grade Plutonium Simulation Results for 10, 20, and 30 kT 
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Table 6: Weapons Grade Pu Simulation at 10 kT Data 
Nuclide Ratio Actual Calculated Percent  
  (ORIGEN2)   Error 
238Pu/239Pu 5.243E-05 5.280E-05 0.27 
240Pu/239Pu 5.054E-02 5.053E-02 0.41 
241Pu/239Pu 1.295E-03 1.280E-03 -0.33 
242Pu/239Pu 5.433E-05 5.463E-05 1.82 
241Am/239Pu 9.370E-04 9.372E-04 0.85 
Burn-up (MWd/MT) 6.053E+03 5.983E+03 -1.16 
 
Table 7: Weapons Grade Pu Simulation at 20 kT Data 
Nuclide Ratio Actual Calculated Percent  
  (ORIGEN2)   Error 
238Pu/239Pu 5.265E-05 5.294E-05 0.55 
240Pu/239Pu 5.033E-02 5.074E-02 0.82 
241Pu/239Pu 1.284E-03 1.279E-03 -0.39 
242Pu/239Pu 5.365E-05 5.573E-05 3.87 
241Am/239Pu 9.292E-04 9.450E-04 1.70 
Burn-up (MWd/MT) 1.211E+04 1.204E+04 -0.51 
 
Table 8: Weapons Grade Pu Simulation at 30 kT Data 
Nuclide Ratio Actual Calculated Percent  
  (ORIGEN2)   Error 
238Pu/239Pu 5.265E-05 5.307E-05 0.78 
240Pu/239Pu 5.033E-02 5.093E-02 1.21 
241Pu/239Pu 1.284E-03 1.278E-03 -0.50 
242Pu/239Pu 5.365E-05 5.695E-05 6.15 
241Am/239Pu 9.292E-04 9.530E-04 2.56 
Burn-up (MWd/MT) 1.816E+04 1.822E+04 0.32 
 
Similarly, the Reactor Grade plutonium case was tested using a series of yields: 
10 kT, 20 kT, and 30 kT.  The results of the Reactor Grade simulation are similar, but 
46 
 
 
 
mirror images of the Weapons Grade simulation.  The results of the three simulations 
can be seen in Figure 9.  The data from each test is located in Table 9, Table 10, and 
Table 11 respectively.  The absolute values for each error increase in the same pattern as 
the previous sample simulations.  However, the largest difference is that the 
methodology under predicts the ratio for each isotope except 241Am.  This is due to the 
assumptions used in deriving the methodology.  Since each of the minor (non 239Pu) 
isotopes have higher atom densities in the material, neglecting secondary effects on these 
isotopes introduces additional error than before. 
 
 
Figure 9: Reactor Grade Pu Simulation Results for 10, 20, and 30 kT 
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Table 9: Reactor Grade Pu Simulation at 10 kT Data 
Nuclide Ratio Actual Calculated Percent  
  (ORIGEN2)   Error 
238Pu/239Pu 5.308E-02 5.245E-02 -1.17 
240Pu/239Pu 4.713E-01 4.672E-01 -0.88 
241Pu/239Pu 1.288E-01 1.263E-01 -1.89 
242Pu/239Pu 1.222E-01 1.214E-01 -0.68 
241Am/239Pu 6.027E-02 6.034E-02 0.12 
Burn-up (MWd/MT) 6.053E+03 5.955E+03 -1.63 
 
Table 10: Reactor Grade Pu Simulation at 20 kT Data 
Nuclide Ratio Actual Calculated Percent  
  (ORIGEN2)   Error 
238Pu/239Pu 5.308E-02 5.183E-02 -2.35 
240Pu/239Pu 4.713E-01 4.629E-01 -1.80 
241Pu/239Pu 1.288E-01 1.240E-01 -3.70 
242Pu/239Pu 1.222E-01 1.206E-01 -1.36 
241Am/239Pu 6.027E-02 6.031E-02 0.07 
Burn-up (MWd/MT) 1.211E+04 1.199E+04 -1.00 
 
Table 11: Reactor Grade Pu Simulation at 30 kT Data 
Nuclide Ratio Actual Calculated Percent  
  (ORIGEN2)   Error 
238Pu/239Pu 5.308E-02 5.122E-02 -3.49 
240Pu/239Pu 4.713E-01 4.589E-01 -2.64 
241Pu/239Pu 1.288E-01 1.217E-01 -5.49 
242Pu/239Pu 1.222E-01 1.198E-01 -2.00 
241Am/239Pu 6.027E-02 6.032E-02 0.08 
Burn-up (MWd/MT) 1.816E+04 1.796E+04 -1.13 
 
 An interesting trend is seen in Figure 8 and Figure 9.  By examining each isotope 
individually over the three different yields, the increase in error for each step is 
approximately the amount of error in the 10 kT simulation.  This is constant through all 
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of the isotopic ratios.  From this result, the error in each term is correlated to the amount 
of flux simulated.  Potentially this relationship could be used to reduce or predict the 
expected error in a specific ratio. 
Sensitivity Analysis 
Twelve physical constants are used in the system of equations for the inverse 
method.  These constants consist of fission yields, cross-sections, masses, and the energy 
recoverable from fission.  Errors and uncertainties in these constants could have a 
significant impact on the final results.  Typically, some of the cross-section data for 
plutonium is known very well due to years of weapons testing and design.  The 
uncertainty in this particular quantity will come from choosing which spectrum averaged 
cross-sections to use.  The cross-sections built in to the ORIGEN2 libraries were used 
here.  If there were a need to use this methodology, the data from a weapons code would 
likely be used.  The ORIGEN2 library FFTF values are very similar to the fission 
spectrum averages.  Likewise, each of the fission yields, energy recoverable per fission, 
and initial plutonium atomic mass could contribute to errors in the final results.  The 
input data from a mass spectrometry analysis should be relatively accurate and the bulk 
of the error and uncertainty will be introduced by the assumptions made about the 
device. 
Equivalent Uncertainty 
Several of the physical constants are used multiple times in the inverse 
methodology.  The reoccurring constants are expected to have the greatest impact on the 
final output of the system.  In order to test the relative effects of each individual 
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impact on the yield calculation, but did not affect the ratios at all.  This effect is expected 
since these quantities essentially are only introduced to find the burn-up. 
Orthogonal Random Sampling Method 
 As can be seen in Chapter III, the inverse methodology is complex.  As a result, 
the uncertainty propagation is equally complex.  This complexity makes traditional error 
propagation through the equations impractical.  In order to study the sensitivity of the 
methodology, an orthogonal random sampling was performed instead.  This technique 
allows for multiple perturbations of the constants simultaneously. 
 Some of the uncertainties were particularly hard to find.  One instance was the 
uncertainty in the fission yield data.  Using raw data from the Los Alamos National 
Laboratory data archive known as T-2 (44), a percent uncertainty was found for each of 
the fission yields for the fission of 239Pu.  Each fission product has several values.  These 
were combined using a weighted average.  This was then applied to the fission yield 
being applied in the methodology.  Other uncertainties were found in recent journal 
articles and the libraries of the ORIGEN2 code. (45) (38)  The uncertainties used for each 
variable can be found in Table 12. 
Each of the variables containing uncertainty is assumed to have a normally 
distributed error function.  This is a fairly good approximation due to the tendency of 
processes in physics to follow the normal distribution as described in the central limit 
theorem. (46)  For each variable, the uncertainty was expanded to a three-sigma spread.  
Then using a random number generator a value within the range was selected for each 
constant.  For this analysis, one variable was changed.  For each subsequent test, the 
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previously randomly sampled variables and one additional variable was also selected to 
be changed.  These constants were then fed into the methodology to observe changes in 
the output of the system.  The perturbations for this sampling can be seen in Figure 11.  
The table shows that even with significant changes in the constants, only one time out of 
twelve did the results differ significantly from the calculations done using the standard 
values.  The results from the orthogonal sampling can be seen in Figure 12.  The data for 
this analysis is contained in APPENDIX C.  As a result, the methodology is not overly 
sensitive to normal uncertainty perturbations in the system. 
 
Table 12: Uncertainties of Constants Used in Orthogonal Random Sampling 
Variable Percent Uncertainty 
Mass of Pu 1.00 
σ Pu-239 (n,f) 6.50 
σ Pu-239 (n,γ) 13.00 
σ Pu-239 (n,a) 5.00 
σ Pu-239 (n,2n) 25.00 
σ Pu-240 (n,γ) 13.38 
σ Pu-241 (n,γ) 3.00 
σ Pu-241 (n,a) 5.00 
Y Sr-89 3.69 
Y Sr-90 4.26 
Y Zr-95 11.63 
E recoverable 5.00 
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSIONS 
 A computationally efficient model that could use post-detonation environmental 
data to calculate pre-detonation isotopic ratios for the plutonium comprising a terrorist 
improvised nuclear device was developed and tested.  This work completed 
independently of any classified work being done at the national laboratory level. 
 This methodology was developed and implemented in Microsoft Excel.  Due to 
its simplicity of operation, it can be run on any computer that can handle the Microsoft 
Office software.  This methodology explores the concept of post-event attribution in a 
way that incorporates standard nuclear engineering assumptions made in reactor 
calculations to provide insight into the origins of a nuclear weapon.  The method is 
based on the first principles of neutron interactions to attack the inverse problem from 
basic fundamentals.  This inverse methodology was tested against possible scenarios. 
 This testing showed that the calculated values of this methodology are reasonably 
accurate.  This work sacrifices some accuracy for speed of computation; however, the 
results of the calculation are within two percent of the expected values for all but the 
242Pu ratios.  As the amount of energy released in the detonation increases, the 
uncertainty increases in the calculations.  This uncertainty is a result of the number of 
increased fission in isotopes other than 239Pu.  This increase in error is linear and should 
be predictable and thus correctable in practical use.  
 Since this work examined a very specific IND design, several limitations arise 
for applying the methodology to a wider spectrum of devices.  This program would not 
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be appropriate for analysis of data from a boosted weapon.  This work does not consider 
uranium based weapons.  For uranium based IND’s, a separate system would be used 
similar to one described in the previous works section of Chapter I. 
 The output of this methodology has very good potential to be used as input to 
another more computationally intensive and sophisticated method.  Ideally the output 
from this work should narrow the input parameters and provide a better initial guess at 
the solution.  Further, while another method is being run, these results could potentially 
rule out several sources of plutonium.  In the nuclear forensics world, quickly ruling out 
possible origins is nearly as important as knowing the exact origin.   
  
 Several endeavors can be pursed to improve upon the methodology presented in 
this work. 
(1) This methodology could be tested using a different and more weapons specific 
forward model to better assess its viability. 
(2) A multi-group approach could be considered to increase the accuracy of the 
fission product yields, cross sections, and energies released. 
(3) An iterative approach could be used in conjunction with a forward model to 
determine characteristics about the design of the weapon. 
(4) This work could be coupled to a more sophisticated attribution effort to be tested 
as initial input data. 
(5) Exotic materials and contaminants should be considered.  This would include 
testing potential spoofing techniques as well. 
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The work presented here is a first principles based development of a post-event 
attribution methodology.  Efforts have been made to ensure that the methodology is 
geometry independent in order to reduce the number of embedded assumptions.  The 
result was a reasonably accurate system that has the potential to be used as an input 
mechanism for a more sophisticated attribution system.  This work has the potential to 
significantly decrease the overall time required to complete the attribution process in the 
event of a nuclear IND detonation. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
EXAMPLE ORIGEN2 INPUT DECK 
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ORIGEN2 Deck for a 10 kT Blast of Weapons Grade Sample 
 
 
 
 
-1 
-1 
-1 
  RDA PU sphere - swab 4 
  RDA 1 MT Pu 
  LIB  0 1 2 3 381 382 383 9 50 0 1 0 
  INP  1   1  -1  -1   1   1 
  BUP 
  IRP  6000.0 87166.665   1 2 1 2 BURNUP 
  DEC  1.0           2 3 4 0 DECAY= 1 day after blast 
  DEC  7.0     3 4 4 0 DECAY= 7 days after blast 
  BUP   
  OPTL 2*8 8 8 8 23*8 
  OPTA 2*8 8 8 5 14*8 5 8 5 6*8 
  OPTF 2*8 8 8 5 23*8 
  OUT  4   1  -1   0 
  END 
 2 922340 4.6    942380 49.8    942390 949800  942400  48000   
 2 942410 1230   942420 51.6    952410 890.0   932370  8.8 
  0
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APPENDIX B 
 
COMPLETE INVERSE METHODOLOGY DERIVATION 
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Time of Explosion: 
Based on the small yield fraction of the Yttrium nuclides, we will use 
concentrations of Yttrium to determine the exact time of the detonation.  This seems 
trivial because it is pretty obvious when a nuclear weapon is detonated; however, this 
determination will date the precise time of detonation in order to correct for decay.  
Also, by knowing the exact amount of decay time, we can confirm the time of detonation 
as a check to make sure that our equations and program is functioning properly. 
First we recall the basic decay equations for parent and daughter nuclides: 
 ௌܰ௥ି଼ଽሺݐሻ ൌ ௌܰ௥ି଼ଽሺ0ሻ݁ିఒೄೝషఴవ௧ (1)  
 ௒ܰି଼ଽሺݐሻ ൌ ௌܰ௥ି଼ଽሺ0ሻൣ1 െ ݁ିఒೄೝషఴవ௧൧ (2)  
These equations assume that the entire production of Yittrium-89 is from the 
decay of Strontium-89.  This is a reasonable assumption as the fission yield for Yt-89 is 
quite low.  Next we will divide the Sr-89 equation into the Yt-89 equation. 
 ௒ܰି଼ଽሺݐሻ
ௌܰ௥ି଼ଽሺݐሻ
ൌ ௌܰ௥ି଼ଽ
ሺ0ሻ
ௌܰ௥ି଼ଽሺ0ሻ
ൣ1 െ ݁ିఒೄೝషఴవ௧൧
݁ିఒೄೝషఴవ௧
 
(3)  
 ௒ܰି଼ଽሺݐሻ
ௌܰ௥ି଼ଽሺݐሻ
ൌ ݁ିఒೄೝషఴవ௧ െ 1 
(4)  
Then with a little algebraic work we can find an expression for the decay time 
based on the ratio of Y to Sr at any time T. 
 
ௗܶ௘௖௔௬ ൌ
1
ߣௌ௥ି଼ଽ
݈݊ ൤ ௒ܰି଼ଽ
ሺݐሻ
ௌܰ௥ି଼ଽሺݐሻ
൅ 1൨ 
(5)  
 ௘ܶ௩௘௡௧ ൌ ௠ܶ௘௔௦௨௥௘௠௘௡௧ െ ௗܶ௘௖௔௬ (6)  
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In looking at this problem we will first examine the atomic densities of known fission 
products.  The fission products that we are interested in are Strontium-89, Zirconium-95, 
and Strontium-90. 
Strontium-90: 
First, we will start with our basic change rate equation.  This is the difference between 
the production and loss rates: 
 ݀ ௌܰ௥ିଽ଴
݀ݐ
ൌ ሼ݌ݎ݋݀ݑܿݐ݅݋݊ሽ െ ሼ݈݋ݏݏሽ (7)  
 ݀ ௌܰ௥ିଽ଴
݀ݐ
ൌ ௌܻ௥ିଽ଴ߑ௙
௉௨ିଶଷଽ߮ െ ߣௌ௥ିଽ଴ ௌܰ௥ିଽ଴ െ ߪௌ௥ିଽ଴ ௌܰ௥ିଽ଴߮ (8)  
Now we will simplify this equation.  First, we know that the half life of Strontium-90 is 
approximately 28.78 years according to the Chart of Nuclides.  Thus we will not need to 
worry about any significant decay over our desired time frame.  Secondly, the cross 
section of Strontium-90 is dominated by elastic scattering (4.8 barns of 5.6 barns 
according to atom.kaeri.re.kr…).  Thus our equation simplifies: 
 ݀ ௌܰ௥ିଽ଴
݀ݐ
ൌ ௌܻ௥ିଽ଴ߑ௙
௉௨ିଶଷଽ߮ (9)  
Next, we will rearrange and integrate over a time T for fission to occur during the 
detonation process which will be approximately 10-6 seconds. 
 ݀ ௌܰ௥ିଽ଴ ൌ ௌܻ௥ିଽ଴ߑ௙௉௨ିଶଷଽሺݐሻ߮ሺݐሻ݀ݐ (10)  
 න ݀ ௌܰ௥ିଽ଴
்
଴
ൌ ௌܻ௥ିଽ଴ න ߑ௙
௉௨ିଶଷଽሺݐሻ߮ሺݐሻ݀ݐ
்
଴
 (11)  
 ௌܰ௥ିଽ଴ ൌ ௌܻ௥ିଽ଴ න ߑ௙௉௨ିଶଷଽሺݐሻ߮ሺݐሻ݀ݐ
்
଴
 (12)  
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Next we will make an approximation which will ease our calculations.  The first of 
which is dealing with the device yield. 
 ܧ௬௜௘௟ௗ ൌ ௩ܸ௢௟௨௠௘ܧ௥௘௟௘௔௦௘ௗ න ߑ௙௉௨ିଶଷଽሺݐሻ߮ሺݐሻ݀ݐ
்
଴
 (13)  
 
ܧ௬
ܸܧ௥
ൌ න ߑ௙
௉௨ିଶଷଽሺݐሻ߮ሺݐሻ݀ݐ
்
଴
 (14)  
We define burn up (BU) to be the yield of the device over the mass of the fissile 
material.  Also we define the density of the Plutonium-239 in our device.  Thus: 
 ߖ ൌ
ܧ௬
݉଴
௉௨ (15)  
 ߩ௉௨ ൌ
݉଴௉௨
ܸ
 (16)  
   Then combining these definitions, we have: 
 න ߑ௙௉௨ିଶଷଽሺݐሻ߮ሺݐሻ݀ݐ
்
଴
ൌ ߖ
1
ܧ௥
ߩ௉௨ିଶଷଽ (17)  
 ௌܰ௥ିଽ଴ ൌ ௌܻ௥ିଽ଴ න ߑ௙௉௨ିଶଷଽሺݐሻ߮ሺݐሻ݀ݐ
்
଴
 (18)  
 ௌܰ௥ିଽ଴ ൌ ௌܻ௥ିଽ଴ߖ
1
ܧ௥
ߩ௉௨ିଶଷଽ (19)  
We are really interested in the ratio of the Strontium-90 to the Plutonium-239 left.  Thus 
we introduce that quantity. 
 ௌܰ௥ିଽ଴ሺܶሻ
௉ܰ௨ିଶଷଽሺܶሻ
௉ܰ௨ିଶଷଽሺܶሻ
ൌ ௌܻ௥ିଽ଴ߖ
1
ܧ௥
ߩ௉௨ିଶଷଽ (20)  
 ௌܰ௥ିଽ଴
ሺܶሻ
௉ܰ௨ିଶଷଽሺܶሻ
ൌ ௌܻ௥ିଽ଴ߖ
1
ܧ௥
ߩ௉௨ିଶଷଽ
௉ܰ௨ିଶଷଽሺܶሻ
 (21)  
66 
 
 
 
 ௌܰ௥ିଽ଴
ሺܶሻ
௉ܰ௨ିଶଷଽሺܶሻ
ൌ ௌܻ௥ିଽ଴ߖ
1
ܧ௥
௉ܰ௨ሺ0ሻ
௉ܰ௨ିଶଷଽሺܶሻ
݉௉௨
௔ܰ
௉ܰ௨ିଶଷଽሺ0ሻ
௉ܰ௨ିଶଷଽሺ0ሻ
 (22)  
 ௌܰ௥ିଽ଴
ሺܶሻ
௉ܰ௨ିଶଷଽሺܶሻ
ൌ ௌܻ௥ିଽ଴
1
ܧ௥
݉௉௨
௔ܰ
ቊߖ ௉ܰ௨ିଶଷଽ
ሺ0ሻ
௉ܰ௨ିଶଷଽሺܶሻ
௉ܰ௨ሺ0ሻ
௉ܰ௨ିଶଷଽሺ0ሻ
ቋ (23)  
We will now substitute a variable for the bracketed quantity as shown here. 
 
Ψ௑ ൌ ቊΨ
௉ܰ௨ିଶଷଽሺ0ሻ
௉ܰ௨ିଶଷଽሺܶሻ
௉ܰ௨ሺ0ሻ
௉ܰ௨ିଶଷଽሺ0ሻ
ቋ 
(24)  
Then by making this substitution, we have: 
 ௌܰ௥ିଽ଴
ሺܶሻ
௉ܰ௨ିଶଷଽሺܶሻ
ൌ ௌܻ௥ିଽ଴
1
ܧ௥
݉௉௨
௔ܰ
Ψ௑ (25)  
Now we have an equation with known or measurable quantities, which will allow us to 
solve for the bracketed quantity.  Likewise we can find a similar equation for Strontium-
89 and Zirconium-95.  The only difference between those two equations will be the 
quantity for the measured fission product and yield. 
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Plutonium-240: 
Next we wish to examine Plutonium-240 with our same change rate equation: 
 ݀ ௉ܰ௨ିଶସ଴
݀ݐ
ൌ ሼ݌ݎ݋݀ݑܿݐ݅݋݊ሽ െ ሼ݈݋ݏݏሽ (26)  
 ݀ ௉ܰ௨ିଶସ଴
݀ݐ
ൌ ߑ௔௉௨ିଶଷଽ߮ െ ߣ௉௨ିଶସ଴ ௉ܰ௨ିଶସ଴ െ ߑ௔௉௨ିଶସ଴߮ (27)  
Since Pu-240 has approximately a 6564 year half life.  We are going to neglect our 
decay term over our time period.  Also, in examining the cross sections of Plutonium-
240, we find that the total cross section is 7.7 barns and the scattering cross section is 5.2 
barns.  Thus we may also neglect this term. 
 ݀ ௉ܰ௨ିଶସ଴
݀ݐ
ൌ ߑ௔௉௨ିଶଷଽ߮ሺݐሻ (28)  
 
݀ ௉ܰ௨ିଶସ଴
݀ݐ
ൌ ܰ௉௨ିଶଷଽߪఊ௉௨ିଶଷଽ߮ሺݐሻ
ߪ௙
௉௨ିଶଷଽ
ߪ௙
௉௨ିଶଷଽ (29)  
 
݀ ௉ܰ௨ିଶସ଴
݀ݐ
ൌ ൣܰ௉௨ିଶଷଽߪ௙
௉௨ିଶଷଽ߮ሺݐሻ൧
ߪఊ௉௨ିଶଷଽ
ߪ௙
௉௨ିଶଷଽ (30)  
Now we will substitute in the definition of the macroscopic cross-section. Thus we get: 
 
݀ ௉ܰ௨ିଶସ଴ ൌ
ߪఊ௉௨ିଶଷଽ
ߪ௙
௉௨ିଶଷଽ ߑ௙
௉௨ିଶଷଽሺݐሻ߮ሺݐሻ݀ݐ 
(31)  
 
න ݀ ௉ܰ௨ିଶସ଴
்
଴
ൌ
ߪఊ௉௨ିଶଷଽ
ߪ௙
௉௨ିଶଷଽ න ߑ௙
௉௨ିଶଷଽሺݐሻ߮ሺݐሻ݀ݐ
்
଴
 
(32)  
Now, we will recall our simplification of our macroscopic cross-section and flux integral 
from before:  
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න ߑ௙
௉௨ିଶଷଽሺݐሻ߮ሺݐሻ݀ݐ
்
଴
ൌ ߖ
1
ܧ௥
ߩ௉௨ିଶଷଽ 
(33)  
The resulting equation is as follows: 
 
௉ܰ௨ିଶସ଴ሺܶሻ െ ௉ܰ௨ିଶସ଴ሺ0ሻ ൌ
ߪఊ௉௨ିଶଷଽ
ߪ௙
௉௨ିଶଷଽ ߖ
1
ܧ௥
ߩ௉௨ିଶଷଽ 
(34)  
 ௉ܰ௨ିଶସ଴ሺܶሻ െ ௉ܰ௨ିଶସ଴ሺ0ሻ
௉ܰ௨ିଶଷଽሺܶሻ
ൌ
ߪఊ௉௨ିଶଷଽ
ߪ௙
௉௨ିଶଷଽ ߖ
1
ܧ௥
ߩ௉௨
௉ܰ௨ିଶଷଽሺܶሻ
 
(35)  
 ௉ܰ௨ିଶସ଴ሺܶሻ െ ௉ܰ௨ିଶସ଴ሺ0ሻ
௉ܰ௨ିଶଷଽሺܶሻ
ൌ
ߪఊ௉௨ିଶଷଽ
ߪ௙
௉௨ିଶଷଽ ߖ
1
ܧ௥
ߩ௉௨
௉ܰ௨ିଶଷଽሺܶሻ
௔ܰ݉௉௨
௔ܰ݉௉௨
 
(36)  
Then by noting the definition of atom density, we can simplify further, 
 ௉ܰ௨ିଶସ଴ሺܶሻ െ ௉ܰ௨ିଶସ଴ሺ0ሻ
௉ܰ௨ିଶଷଽሺܶሻ
ൌ
ߪఊ௉௨ିଶଷଽ
ߪ௙
௉௨ିଶଷଽ
݉௉௨
௔ܰ
ߖ
1
ܧ௥
௉ܰ௨ሺ0ሻ
௉ܰ௨ିଶଷଽሺܶሻ
௉ܰ௨ିଶଷଽሺ0ሻ
௉ܰ௨ିଶଷଽሺ0ሻ
 
(37)  
Using the same approximations and substitutions as above: 
 ௉ܰ௨ିଶସ଴ሺܶሻ
௉ܰ௨ିଶଷଽሺܶሻ
െ ௉ܰ௨ିଶସ଴
ሺ0ሻ
௉ܰ௨ିଶଷଽሺܶሻ
ൌ
ߪఊ௉௨ିଶଷଽ
ߪ௙
௉௨ିଶଷଽ
݉௉௨
௔ܰ
1
ܧ௥
ቊΨ ௉ܰ௨ିଶଷଽ
ሺ0ሻ
௉ܰ௨ିଶଷଽሺܶሻ
௉ܰ௨ሺ0ሻ
௉ܰ௨ିଶଷଽሺ0ሻ
ቋ 
(38)  
 ௉ܰ௨ିଶସ଴ሺ0ሻ
௉ܰ௨ିଶଷଽሺܶሻ
ൌ ௉ܰ௨ିଶସ଴
ሺܶሻ
௉ܰ௨ିଶଷଽሺܶሻ
െ
ߪఊ௉௨ିଶଷଽ
ߪ௙
௉௨ିଶଷଽ
݉௉௨
௔ܰ
1
ܧ௥
ΨX 
(39)  
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Plutonium-239: 
One of the two main fissile materials used to make nuclear weapons is Pu-239.  If a 
weapon is made using this material, there will be traces left after the weapon is 
detonated.  This trace signature is important.  We will be comparing most of our other 
values to this amount of Pu-239 left after the explosion.   
Again, we will start with our change rate equation: 
 ݀ ௉ܰ௨ିଶଷଽ
݀ݐ
ൌ ሼ݌ݎ݋݀ݑܿݐ݅݋݊ሽ െ ሼ݈݋ݏݏሽ (40)  
 ݀ ௉ܰ௨ିଶଷଽ
݀ݐ
ൌ െߪ௔௉௨ିଶଷଽ ௉ܰ௨ିଶଷଽሺݐሻ߮ሺݐሻ (41)  
We will try to match find a similar equation to our Pu-240, thus we will use the same 
methodology in deriving an equation based on Pu-239. 
 
݀ ௉ܰ௨ିଶଷଽ
݀ݐ
ൌ െߪ௔௉௨ିଶଷଽ
ߪ௙
௉௨ିଶଷଽ
ߪ௙
௉௨ିଶଷଽ ௉ܰ௨ିଶଷଽሺݐሻ߮ሺݐሻ (42)  
 ݀ ௉ܰ௨ିଶଷଽ ൌ െ
ߪ௔௉௨ିଶଷଽ
ߪ௙
௉௨ିଶଷଽ ߪ௙
௉௨ିଶଷଽ
௉ܰ௨ିଶଷଽሺݐሻ߮ሺݐሻ݀ݐ (43)  
 න ݀ ௉ܰ௨ିଶଷଽ
்
଴
ൌ െ
ߪ௔௉௨ିଶଷଽ
ߪ௙
௉௨ିଶଷଽ න ߑ௙
௉௨ିଶଷଽሺݐሻ߮ሺݐሻ݀ݐ
்
଴
 (44)  
We will now insert our burn-up relation to be consistent with our equations to develop 
our system of equations. 
 න ݀ ௉ܰ௨ିଶଷଽ
்
଴
ൌ െ
ߪ௔௉௨ିଶଷଽ
ߪ௙
௉௨ିଶଷଽ ߖ
1
ܧ௥
ߩ௉௨ (45)  
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 ௉ܰ௨ିଶଷଽሺܶሻ െ ௉ܰ௨ିଶଷଽሺ0ሻ ൌ െ
ߪ௔௉௨ିଶଷଽ
ߪ௙
௉௨ିଶଷଽ ߖ
1
ܧ௥
ߩ௉௨ (46)  
We need to get an equation of the same form as before, so we will manipulate our terms 
as follows: 
 ௉ܰ௨ିଶଷଽ
ሺܶሻ െ ௉ܰ௨ିଶଷଽሺ0ሻ
௉ܰ௨ିଶଷଽሺܶሻ
ൌ െ
ߪ௔௉௨ିଶଷଽ
ߪ௙
௉௨ିଶଷଽ ߖ
1
ܧ௥
ߩ௉௨
௉ܰ௨ିଶଷଽሺܶሻ
 (47)  
 1 െ ௉ܰ௨ିଶଷଽ
ሺ0ሻ
௉ܰ௨ିଶଷଽሺܶሻ
ൌ െ
ߪ௔௉௨ିଶଷଽ
ߪ௙
௉௨ିଶଷଽ ߖ
1
ܧ௥
௉ܰ௨ሺ0ሻ
௉ܰ௨ିଶଷଽሺܶሻ
݉௉௨
௔ܰ
 (48)  
 
1 െ ௉ܰ௨ିଶଷଽ
ሺ0ሻ
௉ܰ௨ିଶଷଽሺܶሻ
ൌ െ
ߪ௔௉௨ିଶଷଽ
ߪ௙
௉௨ିଶଷଽ ߖ
1
ܧ௥
݉௉௨
௔ܰ
௉ܰ௨ሺ0ሻ
௉ܰ௨ିଶଷଽሺܶሻ
௉ܰ௨ିଶଷଽሺ0ሻ
௉ܰ௨ିଶଷଽሺ0ሻ
 
(49)  
 
1 െ ௉ܰ௨ିଶଷଽ
ሺ0ሻ
௉ܰ௨ିଶଷଽሺܶሻ
ൌ െ
ߪ௔௉௨ିଶଷଽ
ߪ௙
௉௨ିଶଷଽ
1
ܧ௥
݉௉௨
௔ܰ
ቊߖ ௉ܰ௨
ሺ0ሻ
௉ܰ௨ିଶଷଽሺܶሻ
௉ܰ௨ିଶଷଽሺ0ሻ
௉ܰ௨ିଶଷଽሺ0ሻ
ቋ 
(50)  
 ௉ܰ௨ିଶଷଽ
ሺ0ሻ
௉ܰ௨ିଶଷଽሺܶሻ
ൌ 1 ൅
ߪ௔௉௨ିଶଷଽ
ߪ௙
௉௨ିଶଷଽ
1
ܧ௥
݉௉௨
௔ܰ
ߖ௑ (51)  
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Plutonium-238: 
Plutonium-238 is one of the main pollutants in the plutonium device and we will derive 
the relationship for this isotope’s concentration before the event.  Once again we will 
start with the basic change rate equation.  We also assume that there is only production 
of Pu-238 by the (n,2n) reaction in Pu-239.   
 ݀ ௉ܰ௨ିଶଷ଼
݀ݐ
ൌ ሼ݌ݎ݋݀ݑܿݐ݅݋݊ሽ െ ሼ݈݋ݏݏሽ 
(52)  
 ݀ ௉ܰ௨ିଶଷ଼
݀ݐ
ൌ ߪ௡,ଶ௡௉௨ିଶଷଽ ௉ܰ௨ିଶଷଽሺݐሻ߮ሺݐሻ െ 0 
(53)  
Similarly to our previous equations we will assume that the amount of Plutonium-239 
atoms is approximately constant over the irradiation period.  We will also assume a 
constant flux to simplify our math. 
 ݀ ௉ܰ௨ିଶଷ଼ ൌ
ߪ௡,ଶ௡௉௨ିଶଷଽ
ߪ௙
௉௨ିଶଷଽ ߪ௙
௉௨ିଶଷଽ
௉ܰ௨ିଶଷଽሺݐሻ߮ሺݐሻ݀ݐ (54)  
 න ݀ ௉ܰ௨ିଶଷ଼
்
଴
ൌ
ߪ௡,ଶ௡௉௨ିଶଷଽ
ߪ௙
௉௨ିଶଷଽ න ߑ௙
௉௨ିଶଷଽሺݐሻ߮ሺݐሻ݀ݐ
்
଴
 (55)  
Using the same burn up approximation that we made earlier, we find that our equation 
becomes: 
 ௉ܰ௨ିଶଷ଼ሺܶሻ െ ௉ܰ௨ିଶଷ଼ሺ0ሻ ൌ
ߪ௡,ଶ௡௉௨ିଶଷଽ
ߪ௙
௉௨ିଶଷଽ ߖ
1
ܧ௥
ߩ௉௨ (56)  
Then utilizing the same substitutions as the previous derivations we see that we find a 
corresponding equation for Pu-238. 
 ௉ܰ௨ିଶଷ଼
ሺܶሻ െ ௉ܰ௨ିଶଷ଼ሺ0ሻ
௉ܰ௨ିଶଷଽሺܶሻ
ൌ
ߪ௡,ଶ௡௉௨ିଶଷଽ
ߪ௙
௉௨ିଶଷଽ ߖ
1
ܧ௥
ߩ௉௨
௉ܰ௨ିଶଷଽሺܶሻ
 (57)  
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௉ܰ௨ିଶଷ଼ሺܶሻ
௉ܰ௨ିଶଷଽሺܶሻ
െ ௉ܰ௨ିଶଷ଼
ሺ0ሻ
௉ܰ௨ିଶଷଽሺܶሻ
ൌ
ߪ௡,ଶ௡௉௨ିଶଷଽ
ߪ௙
௉௨ିଶଷଽ
1
ܧ௥
݉௉௨
௔ܰ
൜ߖ ௉ܰ௨ିଶଷଽ
ሺ0ሻ
௉ܰ௨ିଶଷଽሺܶሻ
௉ܰ௨ሺ0ሻ
௉ܰ௨ିଶଷଽሺ0ሻ
ൠ 
(58)  
 ௉ܰ௨ିଶଷ଼
ሺ0ሻ
௉ܰ௨ିଶଷଽሺܶሻ
ൌ ௉ܰ௨ିଶଷ଼
ሺܶሻ
௉ܰ௨ିଶଷଽሺܶሻ
െ
ߪ௡,ଶ௡௉௨ିଶଷଽ
ߪ௙
௉௨ିଶଷଽ
1
ܧ௥
݉௉௨
௔ܰ
ߖ௑ (59)  
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Plutonium-241: 
Plutonium-241 is another “pollutant” in the plutonium metal of the core.  This is an 
important piece of the isotopic concentrations of the initial device in the origin 
determination.  Once again we will start with our basic change rate equation.  We 
assume that change in concentrations is dominated by the (n,gamma) reaction in Pu-240.  
Thus we will neglect the burn up and decay of the Pu-241 (14.4 year half life). 
 ݀ ௉ܰ௨ିଶସଵ
݀ݐ
ൌ ሼ݌ݎ݋݀ݑܿݐ݅݋݊ሽ െ ሼ݈݋ݏݏሽ (60)  
 ݀ ௉ܰ௨ିଶସଵ
݀ݐ
ൌ ߪఊ௉௨ିଶସ଴ ௉ܰ௨ିଶସ଴ሺݐሻ߮ሺݐሻ െ 0 (61)  
We need to relate this isotopes production to the burn up we defined earlier.  This will 
allow us to use a similar methodology. 
 
݀ ௉ܰ௨ିଶସଵ
݀ݐ
ൌ
ߪఊ௉௨ିଶସ଴
ߪ௙
௉௨ିଶଷଽ
௉ܰ௨ିଶସ଴ሺݐሻ
௉ܰ௨ିଶଷଽሺݐሻ
ߪ௙
௉௨ିଶଷଽ
௉ܰ௨ିଶଷଽሺݐሻ߮ሺݐሻ (62)  
 න ݀ ௉ܰ௨ିଶସଵ
்
଴
ൌ
ߪఊ௉௨ିଶସ଴
ߪ௙
௉௨ିଶଷଽ
௉ܰ௨ିଶସ଴ሺݐሻ
௉ܰ௨ିଶଷଽሺݐሻ
න ߑ௙
௉௨ିଶଷଽሺݐሻ߮ሺݐሻ݀ݐ
்
଴
 (63)  
 න ݀ ௉ܰ௨ିଶସଵ
்
଴
ൌ
ߪఊ௉௨ିଶସ଴
ߪ௙
௉௨ିଶଷଽ
௉ܰ௨ିଶସ଴ሺݐሻ
௉ܰ௨ିଶଷଽሺݐሻ
ߖ
1
ܧ௥
ߩ௉௨ (64)  
 
We will assume that the Pu-240 to Pu-239 ratio does not change significantly over time.  
Thus we are able to use the value calculated before in that place.  This should under 
predict the value of the Pu-241 ratio since it does not take into consideration the 
production of Pu-240 which could become Pu-241.  We will also substitute our 
definition of burn up to get: 
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 ௉ܰ௨ିଶସଵሺܶሻ െ ௉ܰ௨ିଶସଵሺ0ሻ ൌ
ߪఊ௉௨ିଶସ଴
ߪ௙
௉௨ିଶଷଽ
௉ܰ௨ିଶସ଴ሺ0ሻ
௉ܰ௨ିଶଷଽሺܶሻ
ߖ
1
ܧ௥
ߩ௉௨ (65)  
 
Then we will multiply by a constant in order to find the consistent factor for the burn up. 
 
௉ܰ௨ିଶସଵሺܶሻ െ ௉ܰ௨ିଶସଵሺ0ሻ
௉ܰ௨ିଶଷଽሺܶሻ
ൌ
ߪఊ௉௨ିଶସ଴
ߪ௙
௉௨ିଶଷଽ
௉ܰ௨ିଶସ଴ሺ0ሻ
௉ܰ௨ିଶଷଽሺܶሻ
ߖ
1
ܧ௥
ߩ௉௨
௉ܰ௨ିଶଷଽሺܶሻ
 
(66)  
 
Then with a little algebra we are able to find the following equation. 
 
௉ܰ௨ିଶସଵሺ0ሻ
௉ܰ௨ିଶଷଽሺܶሻ
ൌ ௉ܰ௨ିଶସଵ
ሺܶሻ
௉ܰ௨ିଶଷଽሺܶሻ
െ
ߪఊ௉௨ିଶସ଴
ߪ௙
௉௨ିଶଷଽ
௉ܰ௨ିଶସ଴ሺ0ሻ
௉ܰ௨ିଶଷଽሺܶሻ
1
ܧ௥
݉௉௨
௔ܰ
൜ߖ ௉ܰ௨ିଶଷଽ
ሺ0ሻ
௉ܰ௨ିଶଷଽሺܶሻ
௉ܰ௨ሺ0ሻ
௉ܰ௨ିଶଷଽሺ0ሻ
ൠ 
(67)  
 
௉ܰ௨ିଶସଵሺ0ሻ
௉ܰ௨ିଶଷଽሺܶሻ
ൌ ௉ܰ௨ିଶସଵ
ሺܶሻ
௉ܰ௨ିଶଷଽሺܶሻ
െ
ߪఊ௉௨ିଶସ଴
ߪ௙
௉௨ିଶଷଽ
௉ܰ௨ିଶସ଴ሺ0ሻ
௉ܰ௨ିଶଷଽሺܶሻ
1
ܧ௥
݉௉௨
௔ܰ
ߖ௑ 
(68)  
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Plutonium-242: 
Plutonium-242 is another isotope contained in the pit.  This is an important piece of the 
isotopic concentrations of the initial device in the origin determination.  Once again we 
will start with our basic change rate equation.  We assume that change in concentrations 
is dominated by the (n,gamma) reaction in Pu-241.  Thus we will neglect the burn up 
and decay of the Pu-242 (373300 year half life). 
 ݀ ௉ܰ௨ିଶସଶ
݀ݐ
ൌ ሼ݌ݎ݋݀ݑܿݐ݅݋݊ሽ െ ሼ݈݋ݏݏሽ (69)  
 ݀ ௉ܰ௨ିଶସଶ
݀ݐ
ൌ ߪఊ௉௨ିଶସଵ ௉ܰ௨ିଶସଵሺݐሻ߮ሺݐሻ െ 0 (70)  
We need to relate this isotopes production to the burn up we defined earlier.  This will 
allow us to use a similar methodology. 
 
݀ ௉ܰ௨ିଶସଶ
݀ݐ
ൌ
ߪఊ௉௨ିଶସଵ
ߪ௙
௉௨ିଶଷଽ
௉ܰ௨ିଶସଵሺݐሻ
௉ܰ௨ିଶଷଽሺݐሻ
ߪ௙
௉௨ିଶଷଽ
௉ܰ௨ିଶଷଽሺݐሻ߮ሺݐሻ (71)  
 න ݀ ௉ܰ௨ିଶସଶ
்
଴
ൌ
ߪఊ௉௨ିଶସଵ
ߪ௙
௉௨ିଶଷଽ
௉ܰ௨ିଶସଵሺݐሻ
௉ܰ௨ିଶଷଽሺݐሻ
න ߑ௙
௉௨ିଶଷଽሺݐሻ߮ሺݐሻ݀ݐ
்
଴
 (72)  
 න ݀ ௉ܰ௨ିଶସଶ
்
଴
ൌ
ߪఊ௉௨ିଶସଵ
ߪ௙
௉௨ିଶଷଽ
௉ܰ௨ିଶସ଴ሺݐሻ
௉ܰ௨ିଶଷଽሺݐሻ
ߖ
1
ܧ௥
ߩ௉௨ (73)  
 
We will assume that the Pu-241 to Pu-239 ratio does not change significantly over time.  
Thus we are able to use the value calculated before in that place.  This should under 
predict the value of the Pu-242 ratio since it does not take into consideration the 
production of Pu-241 which could become Pu-242.  We will also substitute our 
definition of burn up to get: 
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 ௉ܰ௨ିଶସଶሺܶሻ െ ௉ܰ௨ିଶସଶሺ0ሻ ൌ
ߪఊ௉௨ିଶସଵ
ߪ௙
௉௨ିଶଷଽ
௉ܰ௨ିଶସଵሺ0ሻ
௉ܰ௨ିଶଷଽሺܶሻ
ߖ
1
ܧ௥
ߩ௉௨ (74)  
 
Then we will multiply by a constant in order to find the consistent factor for the burn up. 
 
௉ܰ௨ିଶସଶሺܶሻ െ ௉ܰ௨ିଶସଶሺ0ሻ
௉ܰ௨ିଶଷଽሺܶሻ
ൌ
ߪఊ௉௨ିଶସଵ
ߪ௙
௉௨ିଶଷଽ
௉ܰ௨ିଶସଶሺ0ሻ
௉ܰ௨ିଶଷଽሺܶሻ
ߖ
1
ܧ௥
ߩ௉௨
௉ܰ௨ିଶଷଽሺܶሻ
 
(75)  
 
Then with a little algebra we are able to find the following equation. 
 
௉ܰ௨ିଶସଶሺ0ሻ
௉ܰ௨ିଶଷଽሺܶሻ
ൌ ௉ܰ௨ିଶସଶ
ሺܶሻ
௉ܰ௨ିଶଷଽሺܶሻ
െ
ߪఊ௉௨ିଶସଵ
ߪ௙
௉௨ିଶଷଽ
௉ܰ௨ିଶସଵሺ0ሻ
௉ܰ௨ିଶଷଽሺܶሻ
1
ܧ௥
݉௉௨
௔ܰ
൜ߖ ௉ܰ௨ିଶଷଽ
ሺ0ሻ
௉ܰ௨ିଶଷଽሺܶሻ
௉ܰ௨ሺ0ሻ
௉ܰ௨ିଶଷଽሺ0ሻ
ൠ 
(76)  
 
௉ܰ௨ିଶସଶሺ0ሻ
௉ܰ௨ିଶଷଽሺܶሻ
ൌ ௉ܰ௨ିଶସଶ
ሺܶሻ
௉ܰ௨ିଶଷଽሺܶሻ
െ
ߪఊ௉௨ିଶସଵ
ߪ௙
௉௨ିଶଷଽ
௉ܰ௨ିଶସଵሺ0ሻ
௉ܰ௨ିଶଷଽሺܶሻ
1
ܧ௥
݉௉௨
௔ܰ
ߖ௑ 
(77)  
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Americium-241: 
The derivation for Americium ratio is a little different than the plutonium isotopes.  The 
key factor causing this difference is that each of the previous isotopes was being 
produced and not being lost.  Since 241Am is produced by the beta decay of 241Pu.  Over 
the time period we are going to be considering, the decay of 241Pu is basically non-
existent.  Thus it will be neglected.  We start again with our standard change rate 
equation: 
 ݀ ஺ܰ௠ିଶସଵ
݀ݐ
ൌ ሼ݌ݎ݋݀ݑܿݐ݅݋݊ሽ െ ሼ݈݋ݏݏሽ 
(78)  
 ݀ ஺ܰ௠ିଶସଵ
݀ݐ
ൌ 0 െ ஺ܰ௠ିଶସଵሺݐሻߪ௔஺௠ିଶସଵ߮ሺݐሻ 
(79)  
The loss mechanisms for 241Am have been are the loss through neutron absorption.  
Either neutron induced fission or radiative capture is possible for 241Am.  Now we can 
go ahead with solving our differential equation: 
 
 ݀ ஺ܰ௠ିଶସଵ
஺ܰ௠ିଶସଵሺݐሻ
ൌ െߪ௔஺௠ିଶସଵ߮ሺݐሻ
௉ܰ௨ିଶଷଽሺݐሻ
௉ܰ௨ିଶଷଽሺݐሻ
ߪ௙
௉௨ିଶଷଽ
ߪ௙
௉௨ିଶଷଽ ݀ݐ 
(80)  
 ݀ ஺ܰ௠ିଶସଵ
஺ܰ௠ିଶସଵሺݐሻ
ൌ െ
ߪ௔஺௠ିଶସଵ
ߪ௙
௉௨ିଶଷଽ
1
௉ܰ௨ିଶଷଽሺݐሻ
௉ܰ௨ିଶଷଽሺݐሻߪ௙
௉௨ିଶଷଽ߮ሺݐሻ݀ݐ 
(81)  
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න
݀ ஺ܰ௠ିଶସଵ
஺ܰ௠ିଶସଵሺݐሻ
்
଴
ൌ െ
ߪ௔஺௠ିଶସଵ
ߪ௙
௉௨ିଶଷଽ
1
௉ܰ௨ିଶଷଽሺݐሻ
න ௉ܰ௨ିଶଷଽሺݐሻߪ௙
௉௨ିଶଷଽ߮ሺݐሻ݀ݐ
்
଴
 
(82)  
 
݈݊ሾ ஺ܰ௠ିଶସଵሺݐሻሿ଴் ൌ െ
ߪ௔஺௠ିଶସଵ
ߪ௙
௉௨ିଶଷଽ
1
௉ܰ௨ିଶଷଽ
ߖ
ߩ௉௨
ܧ௥
 
(83)  
Now we will need to simplify by exponentiation and simplifying the term in the 
exponential: 
 
ሾ ஺ܰ௠ିଶସଵሺݐሻሿ଴் ൌ ݁ݔ݌ ቈെ
ߪ௔஺௠ିଶସଵ
ߪ௙
௉௨ିଶଷଽ
1
௉ܰ௨ିଶଷଽ
ߖ
ߩ௉௨
ܧ௥
቉ 
(84)  
 
ሾ ஺ܰ௠ିଶସଵሺݐሻሿ଴் ൌ ݁ݔ݌ ቈെ
ߪ௔஺௠ିଶସଵ
ߪ௙
௉௨ିଶଷଽ ߖ௑
݉௉௨
௔ܰܧ௥
቉ 
(85)  
Since the exponent will give us a factor by which the ratio is increased or decreased, we 
find the relative change of the two points of time we are interested in. 
 ஺ܰ௠ିଶସଵሺܶሻ
௉ܰ௨ିଶଷଽሺܶሻ
ൌ ஺ܰ௠ିଶସଵ
ሺ0ሻ
௉ܰ௨ିଶଷଽሺܶሻ
݁ݔ݌ ቈെ
ߪ௔஺௠ିଶସଵ
ߪ௙
௉௨ିଶଷଽ ߖ௑
݉௉௨
௔ܰܧ௥
቉ 
(86)  
 ஺ܰ௠ିଶସଵሺ0ሻ
௉ܰ௨ିଶଷଽሺܶሻ
ൌ ஺ܰ௠ିଶସଵ
ሺܶሻ
௉ܰ௨ିଶଷଽሺܶሻ
݁ݔ݌ ቈ
ߪ௔஺௠ିଶସଵ
ߪ௙
௉௨ିଶଷଽ ߖ௑
݉௉௨
௔ܰܧ௥
቉ 
(87)  
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Summary of Derived Equations: 
 
Decay Time: 
 ௗܶ௘௖௔௬ ൌ
1
ߣௌ௥ି଼ଽ
݈݊ ൤ ௒ܰି଼ଽ
ሺݐሻ
ௌܰ௥ି଼ଽሺݐሻ
൅ 1൨  
 
Strontium-89: 
 ௌܰ௥ି଼ଽሺܶሻ
௉ܰ௨ିଶଷଽሺܶሻ
ൌ ௌܻ௥ି଼ଽ
1
ܧ௥
݉௉௨
௔ܰ
Ψ௑ 
 
 
Strontium-90: 
 ௌܰ௥ିଽ଴
ሺܶሻ
௉ܰ௨ିଶଷଽሺܶሻ
ൌ ௌܻ௥ିଽ଴
1
ܧ௥
݉௉௨
௔ܰ
Ψ௑  
 
Zirconium-95: 
 ௓ܰ௥ିଽହሺܶሻ
௉ܰ௨ିଶଷଽሺܶሻ
ൌ ௓ܻ௥ିଽହ
1
ܧ௥
݉௉௨
௔ܰ
Ψ௑ 
 
 
Plutonium-238: 
 ௉ܰ௨ିଶଷ଼
ሺ0ሻ
௉ܰ௨ିଶଷଽሺܶሻ
ൌ ௉ܰ௨ିଶଷ଼
ሺܶሻ
௉ܰ௨ିଶଷଽሺܶሻ
െ
ߪ௡,ଶ௡௉௨ିଶଷଽ
ߪ௙
௉௨ିଶଷଽ
1
ܧ௥
݉௉௨
௔ܰ
ߖ௑  
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Plutonium-239: 
 ௉ܰ௨ିଶଷଽሺ0ሻ
௉ܰ௨ିଶଷଽሺܶሻ
ൌ 1 ൅
ߪ௔௉௨ିଶଷଽ
ߪ௙
௉௨ିଶଷଽ
1
ܧ௥
݉௉௨
௔ܰ
ߖ௑ 
 
 
Plutonium-240: 
 ௉ܰ௨ିଶସ଴
ሺ0ሻ
௉ܰ௨ିଶଷଽሺܶሻ
ൌ ௉ܰ௨ିଶସ଴
ሺܶሻ
௉ܰ௨ିଶଷଽሺܶሻ
െ
ߪఊ௉௨ିଶଷଽ
ߪ௙
௉௨ିଶଷଽ
݉௉௨
௔ܰ
1
ܧ௥
ΨX  
 
Plutonium-241: 
 
௉ܰ௨ିଶସଵሺ0ሻ
௉ܰ௨ିଶଷଽሺܶሻ
ൌ ௉ܰ௨ିଶସଵ
ሺܶሻ
௉ܰ௨ିଶଷଽሺܶሻ
െ
ߪఊ௉௨ିଶସ଴
ߪ௙
௉௨ିଶଷଽ
௉ܰ௨ିଶସ଴ሺ0ሻ
௉ܰ௨ିଶଷଽሺܶሻ
1
ܧ௥
݉௉௨
௔ܰ
ߖ௑ 
 
 
Plutonium-242: 
 ௉ܰ௨ିଶସଶሺ0ሻ
௉ܰ௨ିଶଷଽሺܶሻ
ൌ ௉ܰ௨ିଶସଶ
ሺܶሻ
௉ܰ௨ିଶଷଽሺܶሻ
െ ௉ܰ௨ିଶସଵ
ሺ0ሻ
௉ܰ௨ିଶଷଽሺܶሻ
ߪఊ௉௨ିଶସଵ
ߪ௙
௉௨ିଶଷଽ
݉௉௨
௔ܰ
1
ܧ௥
Ψ௑ 
 
 
Americium-241: 
 ஺ܰ௠ିଶସଵ
ሺ0ሻ
௉ܰ௨ିଶଷଽሺܶሻ
ൌ ஺ܰ௠ିଶସଵ
ሺܶሻ
௉ܰ௨ିଶଷଽሺܶሻ
݁ݔ݌ ቈ
ߪ௔௕௦௢௥௕
஺௠ିଶସଵ
ߪ௙
௉௨ିଶଷଽ
݉௉௨
௔ܰ
1
ܧ௥
Ψ௑቉  
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APPENDIX C 
 
ORTHOGONAL RANDOM SAMPLING DATA CHART 
 
 
 
 
 
 
82 
  Number of Perturbed Variables 
Variable One Two Three Four Five Six Seven Eight Nine Ten Eleven Twelve 
Mass of 
Pu 236.74 235.52 236.71 239.41 237.91 240.47 235.52 240.59 236.42 239.49 242.95 240.68 
σ Pu-239 
(n,f) 1.77E+00 1.74E+00 1.65E+00 1.77E+00 1.87E+00 1.77E+00 1.72E+00 1.94E+00 1.78E+00 1.81E+00 1.96E+00 1.76E+00 
σ Pu-239 
(n,γ) 3.86E-01 3.86E-01 3.97E-01 4.53E-01 4.03E-01 4.11E-01 3.43E-01 4.10E-01 3.85E-01 4.39E-01 4.60E-01 3.83E-01 
σ Pu-239 
(n,a) 2.16E+00 2.16E+00 2.16E+00 2.28E+00 2.13E+00 2.19E+00 2.15E+00 2.44E+00 2.16E+00 2.01E+00 2.32E+00 2.26E+00 
σ Pu-239 
(n,2n) 8.64E-04 8.64E-04 8.64E-04 8.64E-04 6.70E-04 5.73E-04 8.21E-04 8.08E-04 8.71E-04 5.16E-04 8.32E-04 7.02E-04 
σ Pu-240 
(n,γ) 4.46E-01 4.46E-01 4.46E-01 4.46E-01 4.46E-01 5.33E-01 5.18E-01 4.39E-01 1.90E-01 4.66E-01 4.22E-01 6.16E-01 
σ Pu-241 
(n,γ) 3.75E-01 3.75E-01 3.75E-01 3.75E-01 3.75E-01 3.75E-01 1.99E-01 4.59E-01 4.41E-01 4.13E-01 2.22E-01 3.41E-01 
σ Pu-241 
(n,a) 2.63E+00 2.63E+00 2.63E+00 2.63E+00 2.63E+00 2.63E+00 2.63E+00 2.45E+00 2.71E+00 2.74E+00 2.47E+00 2.81E+00 
Y Sr-89 1.81E-02 1.81E-02 1.81E-02 1.81E-02 1.81E-02 1.81E-02 1.81E-02 1.81E-02 1.87E-02 1.80E-02 1.89E-02 1.70E-02 
Y Sr-90 2.13E-02 2.13E-02 2.13E-02 2.13E-02 2.13E-02 2.13E-02 2.13E-02 2.13E-02 2.13E-02 2.08E-02 2.11E-02 2.01E-02 
Y Zr-95 4.77E-02 4.77E-02 4.77E-02 4.77E-02 4.77E-02 4.77E-02 4.77E-02 4.77E-02 4.77E-02 4.77E-02 5.24E-02 4.61E-02 
E_r 207 207 207 207 207 207 207 207 207 207 207 206.793 
             
Results:                         
Burn Up 5997.37 6027.72 5998.16 5929.17 5970.49 5904.34 6026.65 5899.54 5939.86 5987.49 5603.33 6198.78 
Percent 
Error 0.92 0.42 0.91 2.05 1.37 2.46 0.44 2.54 1.87 1.09 7.43 -2.40 
             
Pu-240/ 
Pu-239 0.050133 0.0500984 0.0500904 0.0498657 0.0501677 0.0500342 0.0502411 0.0501563 0.0501646 0.0499912 0.0501122 0.0500177 
Percent 
Error 0.38 0.45 0.47 0.91 0.31 0.58 0.17 0.34 0.32 0.67 0.43 0.61 
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